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DO THE ADULT CRIME, DO THE ADULT TIME:
DUE PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL IMPLICATIONS FOR A
13-YEAR-OLD SEX OFFENDER SENTENCED TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT IN STATE v. GREEN
I.

INTRODUCTION

Andre Demetrius Green is the only thirteen-year-old sex offender in
North Carolina subjected to a mandatory life sentence.' In 1994, Green
attacked and sexually assaulted a twenty-three-year-old woman. 2 At the
time of the attack, Green was thirteen years old.3 North Carolina had recently lowered the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried in a
criminal court. 4 Thus, North Carolina's juvenile justice system confronted
the possibility of transferring 5a thirteen-year-old sex offender to superior
court to be tried as an adult.
Over the past two decades, the number of violent crimes committed
by juveniles has risen at an alarming rate. 6 When dealing with violent
juveniles, courts are confronted with the dilemma of deciding whether to
adjudicate the juvenile offender in the juvenile courts or the criminal system. 7 States have various mechanisms for transferring juveniles to the
1. See State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 833-34 (N.C. 1998) (noting that Green is
only 13-year-old sex offender to be transferred to superior court and convicted of
first-degree sexual offense under statutory scheme that mandated life sentence for
such offense). For a discussion of changes in the statutory scheme, see infra notes

114-20, 140-42 and accompanying text.
2. See id. at 822 (detailing circumstances of sexual offense).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 829 (noting that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1997) was amended
effective May 1, 1994 to permit transfer of 13-year-old juveniles, and Green committed offense on July 27, 1994 shortly after amendment took effect).

5. See id. at 822 (reporting that State filed Green's transfer petition to supeGEN. STAT. § 7A-610 (1997)). Upon the State's petition, the district court judge "held a probable cause hearing on 18 August 1994
pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-608 to -612 and determined that probable cause
existed and granted the state's motion for transfer." Id.
6. See OFFICE OF JUV. JUSTICE & DELINQ., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTE

rior court pursuant to N.C.

CERTAIN SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN CRIMINAL COURT,
(visited Oct. 3, 1998) <http://ojdp.ncjrs.org/action/sec2.htm> [hereinafter JUVE-

NILE OFFENDERS IN CRIMINAL COURT] (showing 60% increase ofjuvenile arrest rate
for violent crimes) (citing H. SNYDER & M. SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:

A

NATIONAL REPORT, (Aug.

BuTrs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PERSON
FACT SHEET

A.
1985-1994,
1998) <http://

1995)); see

a/SOJEFFREY

OFFENSES IN JUVENILE COURT,

#48 (Oct. 1996), available in (visited Oct. 3,

www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/persoff.txt> (reporting that number of offenses committed
by juveniles "against the person" increased by 93% from 1985 to 1994).

7. See Samuel M. Davis, The JurisdictionalDilemma of the Juvenile Court, 51 N.C.
L. REv. 195, 195-99 (1971) (discussing judicial and political difficulty in determining threshold issue of forum for juvenile offenders). Juvenile justice systems strug-

(707)
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criminal system. 8 North Carolina uses the waiver method of transfer
where, upon a finding of probable cause and petition by the State, ajuvenile court may waive its jurisdiction over the juvenile and transfer the case
to superior court.9
During the waiver and transfer processes, a court must protect the
due process rights of the juvenile by adhering to procedural requirements
and statutory guidelines included in the juvenile code. 10 The Supreme
Court of the United States has also issued a list of criteria that juvenile
court judges should consult when deciding whether to waive jurisdicgle with "the notion of specialized treatment of juveniles who have violated the
criminal code;" yet they recognize their role as preserving socialjustice. Id. at 19596. It is difficult to reconcile legislation and policy inconsistencies regarding jurisdictional grants and limitations of the juvenile system. See id. at 197 n.ll (noting
legislation that limits jurisdiction of juvenile courts where juvenile is accused of
capital or other statutorily excepted offense). Moreover, transferring juveniles creates a gaping inconsistency in ideologies because:
(The legislature's] interpretation of what occurs in the juvenile process is
distorted; they seem to be saying that the redemptive philosophy of the
juvenile court is laudable when dealing with "wayward" youths or childish
pranks, but that when serious criminal offenses are committed, the rehabilitative ideal must be abandoned in favor of the retributive processes of
the criminal law.
Id. at 199.
8. SeeJUVENILE OFFENDERS IN CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 6 (noting that juvenile justice systems vary with state). The three legal mechanisms that states have
adopted for transferring juvenile cases to criminal court are (1) judicial waiver, (2)
prosecutorial discretion, and (3) statutory exclusion. See id. Most states enlist the
judicial waiver; the juvenile justice system will waive jurisdiction over ajuvenile case
upon a motion from the prosecutor and the satisfaction of various statutory due
process requirements. See id. (noting that majority of states enlist system in which
juvenile court must first waive jurisdiction of case before case may be adjudicated
in criminal court). Prosecutorial discretion is a form of concurrent jurisdiction
between the juvenile justice system and the criminal court. See id. In the states
adopting this method, prosecutors may "file certain categories of juvenile cases
directly in criminal court." Id. The third type of "transfer," statutory exclusion, is
not a transfer at all, rather state statutes limit the original jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system to an age lower than 18 years. See id.
For a discussion of waiver of jurisdiction by juvenile courts and concurrent
jurisdiction between juvenile and criminal courts, see Davis, supra note 7, at 199201.
9. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-610 (1997) (providing for transfer by waiver of
jurisdiction by juvenile court where transfer is not required by § 7A-608, which
requires adjudication of juveniles in superior court for Class A felonies).
The juvenile justice system as a whole is beyond the scope of this Note, which
focuses on the due process safeguards of the juvenile justice system and cruel and
unusual punishment ofjuveniles through the adult system. For an in-depth discussion of the juvenile justice system and the mechanics of transfer in North Carolina,
see generally Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Juvenile Justice in Transition-A New Juvenile
Code for North Carolina, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1980) (discussing history of

legislative reform in area of juvenile justice).
10. For a discussion of due process problems in the juvenile justice system,
specifically the process of transferring juveniles to superior court, see infra notes
21-45 and accompanying text.
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tion.'1 Difficulty arises, however, where rehabilitation, the goal of the juvenile code and a criterion listed by the Supreme Court, clashes with the
12
punishments imposed in the criminal system.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina confronted this dilemma in
State v. Green'3 when Green appealed his conviction on the grounds that
(1) North Carolina's transfer statute violated the Due Process Clause by
failing to provide sufficient guidelines for the exercise of judicial discretion and (2) sentencing a thirteen-year-old to life imprisonment for first14
degree sexual offense is cruel and unusual punishment.
This Note discusses and compares the North Carolina Supreme
Court's holding with other state and federal court decisions addressing
the constitutional protections and policy considerations of transferring
and sentencing juveniles. 15 Part II summarizes the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment prohibition
16
against cruel and unusual punishment as applied to juvenile justice.
17
Part III describes the circumstances that led to Green's life sentence.
Part IV traces the North Carolina Supreme Court's approach in upholding
the state's juvenile transfer statute and subsequent sentencing of Green as
constitutionally sound.' 8 Part V analyzes the court's conclusions of law
with specific emphasis on the juvenile justice system's rehabilitative
goals. 19 Finally, part VI focuses on the likely impact of Green for the North
Carolina courts and legislature and for the constitutionality of juvenile
20
sentencing nationwide.
11. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966) (listing criteria for
juvenile judge's consideration). For a discussion of these criteria, see infra notes
29-39 and accompanying text.
12. SeeJudy Briscoe, Breaking the Cycle of Violence: A RationalApproach to At-Risk
Youth, 61 FED. PROBATION 3, 4-5 (Sept. 1997) (discussing failure of policy makers
and criminal justice experts to agree on proper disposition of juvenile crime).
13. 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998)
14. See id. at 823, 828 (listing Green's grounds for appeal).
15. For a discussion of the court's decision in Green, see infra notes 123-44 and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of Supreme Court and lower court decisions outlining
procedural safeguards necessary to preserve due process, see infra notes 21-50 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the constitutional prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments as applied to juveniles, see infra notes 51-96 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of Green's offense, transfer, conviction and sentencing,
see infra notes 97-122 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Green,
see infra notes 123-44 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the appropriateness of the conclusions of law reached
and policy considerations made by the court, see infra notes 145-202 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the consequences of the court's decision in Green, see
infra notes 203-15 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND

Due Process of Law: Application to Juvenile System

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constituion guarantee the right of every defendant to due process of law. 2 1 An
essential requirement of due process is that a statute contain sufficiently
definite criteria to guide a court when exercising discretion under that
statute. 22 The Due Process Clause requires courts to exercise judicial discretion within the bounds provided by the legislature because
"[d]iscretion without a criterion for its exercise is authorization of
23
arbitrariness."
In In re Gault,24 the United States Supreme Court extended the protections of due process to juvenile proceedings. 25 In that case, the transferring judge illegally questioned a juvenile, who had been taken into
21. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The right to due process under state
law is set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. For a discussion of the extension of the Due Process Clause to juvenile proceedings, see infra notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
22. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 10809 (1972) (stating due
process requirements). The United States Supreme Court applied a two-prong
test to determine whether a statute violated due process. See id. at 108. First, a
statute fails to meet due process "if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Id.
This "vagueness" prong deems statutes violative of due process when the illegal
activity is not defined in a way sufficient to "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited." Id. Second, a statute
fails to meet due process by failing to provide guidelines for the court in its exercise of discretion. See id. at 108-09. "[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
is to be prevented, [the Court reasoned that] laws must provide explicit standards
for those who apply them." Id. at 108 (emphasis added); see Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 694 (1959) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("[L]egislation must not be so vague, the language so loose, as to
leave to those who have to apply it too wide a discretion.").
23. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 496 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between "discretion" and 'judicial discretion"). "Judicial discretion"
must be "subject to rational criteria, by which particular situations may be adjudged." Id.
24. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
25. See id. at 21 (extending, in part, constitutional guarantee of procedural
due process to juvenile proceedings). The Supreme Court acknowledged that juvenile proceedings differ from criminal proceedings in that the juvenile benefits
from additional protections. See id. at 22-25 (recognizing that juveniles benefit
from sealed records and rehabilitative efforts). But the Court refused to elevate
these benefits to the level of a constitutional substitute for due process. See id. at
30 (limiting extension of procedural due process protection to juvenile proceedings as something less than criminal proceedings). "There is no reason why, consistently with due process, a State cannot continue if it deems it appropriate, to
provide" benefits to juveniles that they would not be afforded under criminal proceedings. Id. at 25. "In their zeal to care for children neither juvenile judges nor
welfare workers can be permitted to violate the Constitution, especially the constitutional provisions as to due process .... " Id. at 19 n.25 (quoting Arthur T. Van-
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custody for possessing a stolen wallet, and failed to serve appropriate notice of hearing.2 6 The Court noted that the unbridled discretion enjoyed
by juvenile court judges violated several constitutional rights, and it used
the opportunity to impose strict requirements on the juvenile justice systems of the States. 27 Although Gault stands as a landmark decision for the
application of due process to juvenile proceedings, it failed to establish
28
general guidelines that courts could apply to various factual situations.
Other cases, however, have sought to establish these much-needed
guidelines.
1.

Supreme Court Provides Criteria Checklist in United States v. Kent

In United States v. Kent,29 the United States Supreme Court addressed
the statutory mechanism for transferring juveniles to superior court in
Washington, D.C. 30 Thejuvenile courtjudge transferred the defendant to
derbilt, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in foreword to VIRTUE,
BASIC STRUCTURE FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES IN MICHIGAN, (1953)).
26. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 6-9 (stating that juvenile was taken into custody for
possession of stolen wallet and for making comments "of the irritatingly offensive,
adolescent, sex variety"). The Court limited its holding to the facts at hand. See id.
at 13 ("We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state."). Subsequent language in the opinion, however, undermines the Court's qualification. See
id. at 18 ("Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure.") (emphasis added).
27. See id. at 31-58 (criticizing amount of discretion enjoyed by juvenile
judge). The Court listed several requirements to which state juvenile justice systems must adhere. First, the family of the juvenile must have notice of the charges
against the juvenile. See id. at 33. Notice must be given early enough to provide
the family with a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the hearing. See id. (prescribing parameters of adequate notice). Also, notice must "set forth the alleged
misconduct with particularity." Id. Second, a court in a juvenile proceeding must
advise the juvenile of his right to counsel. See id. at 34-36. Third, ajuvenile's Fifth
Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination must be observed in juvenile
proceedings. See id. at 55. Absent such observance, confessions of juveniles may
not be introduced into juvenile proceedings. See id. at 56.
28. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV.
691, 691 (1991) (lauding Gault as transformative advance in due process protection of juveniles); see also Joshua M. Dalton, At the Crossroads of Richmond and
Gault: Addressing Media Access to JuvenileDelinquency ProceedingsThrough a Functional
Analysis, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1155, 1214 (1998) (noting Gault's failure to flesh
out due process requirements in day-to-day operations of juvenile courts).
29. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
30. See id. at 547-48 (noting lack of standards issued to guide juvenile judges
in transfer decisions). Section 11-914 of the Juvenile Court Act was the mechanism
through which transfers were accomplished in Washington, D.C. at the time of the
case. See id. at 547 n.6. The statute read:
If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which
would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged
with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or
life imprisonment, the judge may, afterfull investigation,waive jurisdiction
and order such child held for trial [in superior court] ....
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criminal court on robbery and rape charges without conducting an investigation or stating his reasons in the transfer order. 3 ' The Supreme Court
found that, although the juvenile court judge was granted broad discretion in transferring a juvenile, the defendant's due process rights had not
been preserved. 32 The Court stated that a transfer "without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons" clearly
33
violated the Due Process Clause.
In an appendix to the opinion, the Supreme Court criticized the statute for failing to provide "specific standards for the exercise of this important discretionary act" and for leaving "the formulation of such criteria to
the [j]udge." 34 The Court listed the following eight criteria, now known
as "Kent factors," for the juvenile court judge to consider upon remand:
(1) the "seriousness of the offense" and the need to protect the community against it; (2) the violent and willful manner of the offense; (3)
whether the offense was against persons or property; (4) the prosecutorial
merit of the offense; (5) the economy of trying the juvenile with adults
charged with same crime; (6) the maturity of the juvenile; (7) the juvenile's record; and (8) "the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation . . .by

D.C. CODE § 11-914 (1961) (emphasis added). The District of Columbia employs
the waiver method of transfer. See D.C. CODE § 11-1553 (1961); see also JUVENILE
OFFENDERS IN CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 6 (discussing waiver and petition methods of transfer).
In Kent, the juvenile judge waived jurisdiction and issued the order stating
only "that after 'full investigation, I do hereby waive' jurisdiction of the [defendant]." Kent, 383 U.S. at 546 (quoting juvenile judge's transfer order). The defendant appealed on the basis that the juvenile judge: (1) held no hearing; (2) made
no findings; and (3) failed to state his reasons for transfer. See id. The defendant
also contended that he was denied due process because, if he were an adult, he
would have been entitled to a probable cause hearing. See id. at 551 (detailing due
process challenge). In reviewing the defendant's motion to invalidate the waiver
of jurisdiction, the district court held that the terms "after full investigation" did

not require the judge to hold an evidentiary or any other type of hearing. See id. at
549.
31. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 543-47 (discussing defendant's offenses and juvenile

court judge's conduct in transferring defendant). At the time of transfer, the

transfer statute required that a "full investigation" be conducted before a determination of transfer. See id. at 547 (noting express language of transfer statute) (citing D.C. CODE § 11-914).

32. See id. at 553-54. The juvenile court can use a substantial degree of discretion in selecting the "factual considerations to be evaluated, the weight to be given
them and the conclusion to be reached." Id. at 553. Due process, however, requires that the juvenile be entitled to a hearing and to a statement of reasons for
the judge's decision. See id. at 557 (noting existence of minimal requirements).
The Court passionately decreed that "there is no place in our system of law for
reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony... without
a statement of reasons." Id. at 554.
33. Id. at 554. The Court asserted that such a proceeding against an adult in
this manner was "inconceivable" and it refused to permit such lack of procedure in
juvenile proceedings. See id. (criticizing lack of due process in juvenile
proceeding).
34. Id. at 566.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss4/5

6

Morrissey: Do the Adult Crime, Do the Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel and
1999]

NoTE

713

the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juve35
nile Court."
The Supreme Court did not, however, explicitly state that transfer
statutes were constitutionally required to adopt the Kent factors. 36 The
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits have interpreted Kent as
failing to establish minimum requirements for preserving juveniles' due
process rights. 37 Nevertheless, some circuits have been receptive to the
Kent factors. 38 In addition, numerous states have amended their transfer
39
statutes to include some, if not all, of the Kent factors.
35. Id.
36. See generally id. at 565-68 (declining to require incorporation of Kent fac-

tors into state transfer statutes).
37. See In re M.B., 122 F.3d 164, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that Kent requires only procedural protection sufficient to preserve "fundamental fairness and
due process"); Oviedo v.Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 327 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding transfer statute that incorporated only three of eight Kent factors). "Although the

Supreme Court made it clear that juveniles are entitled to some minimal level of
procedural safeguards, ... the [Supreme] Court did not specify the exact nature
of the constitutional requirements of due process." Id. at 327. At the time of the
transfer, the Ohio Rule ofJuvenile Procedure 30(E) required ajudge contemplating transfer to consider the following five factors:
(1) The child's age and his mental and physical health;
(2) The child's prior juvenile record;
(3) Efforts previously made to treat or rehabilitate the child;
(4) The child's family environment; and
(5) School records.
OHIO R.Juv. P. 30(E) (1987). The Ohio rule substantively covers only three of the
Kent factors. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 566 (listing all eight Kent factors). Notably, the
Ohio rule does not mandate consideration of the seriousness of the offense, its
aggressive nature or the distinction between injury to property or persons. See
OHIo R. Juv. P. 30(E) (listing first, second and third Kent factors). Nevertheless,
the Sixth Circuit held that the judge's decision did not violate the juvenile's due
process. See Oviedo, 809 F.2d at 328-29; see also Patton v. Toy, 867 F. Supp. 356, 362
(D.S.C. 1994) ("[T]he Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that these factors
must be followed by lower courts.").
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's failure to require incorporation of
any specific guidance into state transfer statutes, see infra notes 145-155 and accompanying text.
38. Compare Oviedo, 809 F.2d at 326 (stating that all Kent factors need not be
considered), with Green v. Reynolds, 57 F.3d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating
that Oklahoma courts "strictly adhere to the constitutional precepts announced in
Kent"), and Toomey v. Clark, 76 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting trial court's

"careful and judicious" application of Kent factors).
39. CompareALA. CODE § 12-15-34(d) (1988) (listing six factors, all of which
must be considered), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie 1998) (listing

only three very broad criteria that bear little resemblance to Kent). See generally
Williams v. State, 494 So. 2d 887, 890 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (requiring consideration of all factors).
For a more extensive list of state transfer statutes and required considerations,
see infra note 153.
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In United States ex rel. Pedrosa v. Sielaf,40 the District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois struck down the Illinois transfer statute for
violating the Due Process Clause by failing to provide "any guidelines or
standards" for the judge to follow in making his or her decision. 41 The
defendant argued that his transfer to criminal court on murder charges
violated his due process because the transfer statute was unconstitutionally
vague. 42 The court agreed that the transfer statute's vagueness violated
the Due Process Clause, despite the existence of Illinois decisions constru43
ing the statute to impose sufficient criteria to guide the juvenile courts.
The State in Sielaf further argued that the transfer statute satisfied due
process when read with the rehabilitative policy presented in the preface
to the juvenile code. 44 The Court disagreed and stated that, in a due promust be examined solely on its face
cess challenge for vagueness, a statute
45
and must fail if facially deficient.
40. 434 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
41. Id. at 495. The transfer statute provided:
If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years of age or over of an
act which constitutes a crime under the laws of this State, the State's Attorney shall determine the court in which that minor is to be prosecuted;
however, if the juvenile CourtJudge objects to the removal of a case from
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, the matter shall be referred to the
chief judge of the circuit for decision and disposition. If criminal proceedings are instituted, the petition shall be dismissed insofar as the act
or acts involved in the criminal proceedings are concerned. Taking of
evidence in an adjudicatory hearing in any such case is a bar to criminal
proceedings based upon the conduct alleged in the petition.
ILL. REv. STAT. Chap. 37, § 702-7 (1971).
42. See Sielaf 434 F. Supp. at 495. The defendant also appealed his transfer on
the grounds that the transfer statute did not require a preliminary hearing in the
juvenile court. See id. (noting alternative claims of appeal). The court dismissed
this claim because, although the statute did not provide for a hearing, the defendant was given one and, thus, lacked standing to appeal his transfer on this claim.
See id.
43. See id. at 496-97 (invalidating transfer statute as violative of due process).
The fact that the Illinois courts had read the criteria into the statute was irrelevant.
See id. at 496 (dismissing State's argument that Illinois courts had applied criteria).
The court stated that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because "[n]othing
prevented the Illinois juvenile judge from using any criteria he desired no matter
how arbitrary." Id.
44. See id. at 496. The State argued that reading the transfer statute in light of
the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile code satisfied due process. See id. (setting
forth State's argument). The Court, nonetheless, found that although a statement
of purpose might in some circumstances supply the precision lacking in a statute,
the particular statement at issue provided "little if any" guidance and did not compensate for the vagueness of the transfer statute. See id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT.
§ 701-2 (1971), which provides "Purpose and Policy").
45. See id. (examining statute on face and striking it down for vagueness).
The constitutional test for vagueness is a strict examination of the statute on its
face. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1940) (conducting facial examination of statute restricting First Amendment as test for vagueness); see also
Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1972) (extending Thornhill and strict facial examination test for vagueness to other constitutional rights).
For a discussion of vagueness and the Due Process Clause, see Kathryn J. Parsley,
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Rehabilitative Ideal Still PervadesJuvenile Codes

Rehabilitation is both a Kent factor and, as evidenced by Sielaf the
focus of many debates over juvenile justice and due process. 46 Most juvenile justice systems in America were established for the purpose of rehabilitating the juvenile offender. 47 In fact, North Carolina's juvenile system
was founded on such an ideal. 48 The rehabilitative goals, however, have
been obscured by Gault and Kent-the very Supreme Court decisions that
attempted to protect the due process rights of juveniles. 49 Despite the
early rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system, transfer of a juvenile for reasons other than rehabilitation does not violate ajuvenile's due
process.

50

B.

Cruel & Unusual: Is Punishment Decent and Proportional?

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishments." 51 The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is applicable to state-imposed punishments through the FourNote, ConstitutionalLimitations on State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liablefor the
Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44 VAND. L. REv. 441, 449-51 (1991).
For a discussion of vagueness and its applicability to Green, see infra notes 15666 and accompanying text.
46. See United States v. Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 567 (1966) (listing likelihood of
rehabilitation as factor); see also Sander N. Rothchild, Beyond Incarceration:Juvenile
Sex Offender Treatment Programs Offer Youths a Second Chance,4J.L. & POL'V 719, 73031 (1996) (discussing need for juvenile justice system to rehabilitate offenders);
Victor L. Streib, The Efficacy of Harsh Punishmentsfor Teenage Violence, 31 VAL.U. L.
REv. 427, 428-29 (1997) (advocating preventative and rehabilitative approach to
juvenile justice in lieu of current punitive approach).
47. See Rothchild, supra note 46, at 721-22 (discussing traditional purposes of
state juvenile justice systems). States have traditionally taken a protective role as
"guardian of persons under legal disability" where the disability is age. Id. Early
juvenile systems did not adjudge guilt; rather, the juvenile courts focused on determining how the juvenile had become what he was and how to best save him from
himself. See id. at 730-31 (discussing approach of early juvenile justice systems).
For a discussion of the origins of the juvenile justice system in the United
States, see George Bundy Smith & Gloria M. Dabiri, TheJudicialRole in the Treatment
of Juvenile Delinquents, 3 J.L. & POL'y 347, 351-52 (1995) (discussing early courts'
views of juvenile justice).
48. See, e.g.,
State v. Dellinger, 468 S.E.2d 218, 221 (N.C. 1996) (stating that
Juvenile Code was enacted with "aim that delinquent children might be rehabilitated and reformed and become useful, law-abiding citizens").
49. See Feld, supra note 28, at 695-725 (discussing impact of Gault on juvenile
justice systems). Although the Supreme Court did not intend to change the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system, in the years following Gault, 'judicial[ ] and administrative responses to Gault have modified the juvenile] court's
jurisdiction, purpose, and procedures." Id. at 691.
50. See, e.g., Deel v.Jago, 967 F.2d 1079, 1090 (6th Cir. 1992) (transferring 15year-old, first-time offender to superior court based on seriousness of crime does
not violate due process simply because state's juvenile justice system was founded
with rehabilitative goal).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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teenth Amendment. 52 Additionally, many states have recognized the
importance of the Eighth Amendment prohibition and have adopted similar, if not exact, provisions in their state constitutions. 53 Section 27 of
article 1 of North Carolina's constitution prohibits the imposition of
"cruel or unusual" punishments. 54 Despite potential discrepancies between the use of "and" in the United States Constitution and "or" in the
North Carolina Constitution, North Carolina courts have historically analyzed the state provision in a manner similar to the Supreme Court's analysis of the federal provision. 55 Thus, the Supreme Court's analysis is
applicable here.
The Supreme Court of the United States has defined "cruel and unusual" punishments as (1) barbaric punishments or (2) punishments that
are grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. 56 The Court has
also stated that the Eighth Amendment must be interpreted in a "flexible
and dynamic manner" to reflect societal views. 57 ChiefJustice Warren first

52. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (applying Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to state through Fourteenth Amendment).
53. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art I, § 17 (prohibiting cruel or unusual punishments); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments).
54. See N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 27 (using disjunctive "or," rather than conjunctive
"and," in prohibiting "cruel or unusual" punishments). For a discussion of the
difference between "cruel and unusual" and "cruel or unusual" analysis, see infra
note 136 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., State v. Bronson, 432 S.E.2d 772, 780 (N.C. 1992) (stating that
there is no substantive difference between federal and North Carolina constitutional provisions).
56. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (analyzing phrase "cruel
and unusual"). In Gregg, The Supreme Court traced the history of the prohibition
of "cruel and unusual" punishment from its origin in England. See id. at 169-70
(discussing origin of phrase). The phrase first appeared in the English Bill of
Rights of 1689. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAt. L. REv. 839, 852-53 (1969). The Framers of
the Constitution adopted the phrase to prohibit tortures and other "barbarous"
punishments. See id. at 842 (stating that Framers wished to outlaw infliction of
barbaric punishments). This principle was reflected in early Court decisions. See
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170. For example, in Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court stated, "[1]t is
safe to affirm that punishments of torture ... and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth] [A]mendment .... . 99 U.S.
130, 136 (1879). In In re Kemmler, the Court stated more emphatically that
"[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death." 136
U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
Since these early decisions, interpretations of the Eighth Amendment have
grown to include a disproportionality prohibition. See, e.g., Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-82 (1910). In Weems, the Court rejected the idea that
"cruel and unusual" only applied to torturous punishments. See id. at 367-68 (expanding scope of Eighth Amendment to include requirement that punishments
"be graduated and proportioned to the offense").
57. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171.
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expressed this concept in Trop v. Dulles58 and it has since become the man59
tra of Eighth Amendment interpretation.
1.

Trop v. Dulles: Evolving Standards of Decency

In establishing the dynamic nature of the Eighth Amendment and
whether a punishment is barbaric, the Court in Trap v. Dulles stated that
"[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
60
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Although Trop established the need to look to evolving standards of society, the Court did not state where judges should look to determine those
61
In Gregg v.
standards, and it relied in part on its own subjective beliefs.
62
Georgia, the Court provided some guidance when it stated that judges
must look to "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a
given sanction" to determine the standards of society, but it did not tell
63
Thirteen years
the lower courts where to find these objective indicia.
after Gregg, the Court finally set guidelines for determining by objective
64
The
evidence the societal standards of decency in Stanford v. Kentucky.
58. 356 U.S. 86 (1958)
59. See id. at 100-01 (stating that scope of Eighth Amendment is not static); see
also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (determining scope of Eighth
Amendment in light of "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society") (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (same);
Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Carmona v. Ward, 576
F.2d 405, 429 (2d Cir. 1978) (same); Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 923 (5th
Cir. 1976) (same).
60. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. The Court was confronted with the question of
whether the denationalization of an American citizen upon conviction of a military
court martial for wartime desertion constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 87-88 (discussing facts of case and
appeal). The Court concluded that the punishment violated the Eighth Amendment because it destroyed the defendant's political existence. See id. at 101 (holding that punishment violated Eighth Amendment despite not involving physical
mistreatment or primitive torture). In so holding, the Court went beyond the limited interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting only barbaric punishments by stating that a punishment is cruel and unusual if it violates society's
standards of decency. See id. (establishing "evolving standards of decency" as test
for Eighth Amendment).
61. See generally id. at 101-02 (failing to provide guidelines for determining
standards of society). The Court stated that the punishment of denationalization
was against society's standards of decency because it stripped the punished of their
identity and, therefore, it "believe [d] ...that use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 101.
62. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
63. Id. at 173; see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (requiring use of
objective evidence in determination of standards of decency).
64. 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (stating that federal and state laws are most reliable evidence of standards of decency). In Stanford, the Court was confronted with
the issue of whether sentencing a 17-year-old murderer to death violated the
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 361 (granting certiorari to hear appeal of 17-yearold murderer sentenced to death). The 17 year-old had plead guilty in adult court
and was sentenced to death. See id. (stating that 17 year-old plead guilty after being
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Court held that the primary indicia of the standards of decency are the
"statutes passed by society's elected representatives." 65 Accordingly, after
looking to the capital punishment statutes of all fifty states, the Court concluded that sentencing a seventeen-year-old murderer to death did not
violate the standards of decency.

66

Although the Supreme Court has established sixteen as the constitutional minimum age for capital punishment, the Court has yet to establish
a minimum age for imposing a life sentence. 67 Courts, therefore, still look
to the "evolving standards of decency" when determining the constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment. 68 In Workman v. Commonwealth,69 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that life sentences of
transferred for trial as adult by juvenile court that had conducted proper
hearings).
65. Id. at 370. Standards of decency should be determined in reference to
acts of the legislature. See id. (deeming acts of legislatures as primary evidence of
standards of decency); see also Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1996)
(same). In Gregg, the Court stated that acts of the legislature are presumptively
valid. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 (noting Court's practice of deferring to legislature). Acts of the legislature should not be replaced by ajudge's subjective beliefs.
See id. The Court relied on the fact that legislative representatives are elected by
the people while judges are appointed. See id. (stating that elected representatives

provide better foundation for determining standards of decency).
66. See Stanford, 492 U.S at 370 (examining laws of 50 states before noting that
37 states permitted capital punishment at that time). Among the states that did
permit capital punishment, 22 states permitted imposition of a death sentence on
a 16-year-old murderer while 25 states permitted imposition of a death sentence on
a 17-year-old murderer. See id. In 1989, three statutes did not permit capital punishment of murderers who were under the age of 17. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-9-3
(1982) (setting minimum age for capital punishment at 17); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1417 (1988) (same); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(c) (West 1989) (same).
In 1989, 12 states did not permit capital punishment of murderers who were
under the age of 18. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 190.5 (West 1988) (setting minimum age for capital punishment at 18); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(1) (a)
(1986) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g) (1) (1989) (same); ILL. REV. STAT.,
ch. 38, 9-1(b) (1987) (same); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 412(f) (1988) (same);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (1985) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(XIII)
(1988) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-22(a) (West 1987) (same); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-6-1(A), 31-18-14(A) (1987) (same); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A)
(1987) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.620 (1987) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1102(3), 37-1-102(4), 37-1-103, 37-1-134(a) (1) (1988) (same).
67. See Streib, supra note 46, at 431-32 (noting Court's failure to establish constitutional minimum age for life imprisonment). For a discussion of a minimum
age for life imprisonment, see infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 490 (Minn. 1998) (weighing
constitutionality of life sentence for 14 year-old against standards of decency);
State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 828-29 (N.C. 1998) (measuring life sentence of 13
year-old against standards of decency); Harris, 93 F.3d at 583 (weighing constitutionality of life sentence for 15 year-old against standards of decency); State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613, 623 (S.D. 1998) (weighing constitutionality of life sentence
for 14 year-old against standards of decency).
69. 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
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two fourteen-year-old rapists violated the Eighth Amendment. 70 On August 18, 1958, two fourteen year-old males broke into a seventy-one-yearold woman's home, gagged her and raped her repeatedly. 7' The two
juveniles were tried as adults and sentenced to life imprisonment. 72 Life
sentences were statutorily permitted and, as such, typically would have
been upheld. 73 The court, however, stated that "life imprisonment without benefit of parole for two fourteen-year-old youths under all circum74
stances shocks the general conscience of society today."
The dissent in Workman pointed out that the majority failed to cite a
single case supporting the legal basis of its conclusion. 75 The majority
acknowledged this criticism but stated that the court will defer to the legislature only "with the proviso in mind that th[e] court retain[ed] the
power to determine whether or not an act of legislature violates the provi76
sions of the Constitution."
Notwithstanding the dissent's criticism, Workman's validity is questionable because the case was decided thirty years ago, in 1968, and the standards of decency undoubtedly have evolved. 77 Indeed, the court
70. See id. at 378 (overturning life sentences of two 14-year-old rapists upon
finding that sentences were cruel and unusual). The two juveniles robbed, attempted to rape and sexually assaulted a woman with a mop. See id. at 374.
71. See id. at 374.
72. See id. at 375-77. After convicting the juveniles of rape, the jury requested

life sentences and the court complied by ordering the juveniles to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. See id. The juveniles appealed on the ground

that the punishment violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. See id. at 376.
73. See id. at 377 (noting that holding departs from statutorily permitted sentence). "We have previously held where punishment is within the limits prescribed
by statute it could not be properly classified as cruel punishment." Id.; see Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (stating that legislative enactment demonstrates
standards of decency).
For a discussion of legislation as evidence of society's standards of decency,
see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
74. Workman, 429 S.W.2d at 378 (emphasis added) (applying language,
"shocks the general conscience") (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
75. See id. (MontgomeryJ, dissenting) ("No cases are cited in support of [the
majority's position]."). Furthermore, the dissent relied on precedent in its argument to uphold the sentences, which "[t]he courts 'have steadfastly declined to
interfere' in . . . legislative judgment and discretion." Id. at 379 (quoting Fry v.
Commonwealth, 82 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Ky. 1935)); accord McElwain v. Commonwealth,
159 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1942).
76. Workman, 429 S.W.2d at 377 (dismissing dissent's criticisms by acknowledging power of judiciary to review sentences for cruelty and disproportionality
despite power of legislature to promulgate sentencing guidelines). The court reviewed the punishment under the standards of decency to determine whether it
"shock[s] the moral sense of the community." Id. In that sense, the court followed
Trop but did not follow Stanford because the court did not determine the standards
of decency by looking to acts of the legislature. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70
(stating that courts and judges owe deference to state legislatures).
77. See Workman, 429 S.W.2d at 378 (stating proposition that Eighth Amendment prohibitions are not static and standards of decency evolve). Workman was
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anticipated this evolution and restricted its holding accordingly by stating
that (1) the punishment "shocks the general conscience of society today"
and (2) resort to "ancient authorities" is not required when determining
78
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.
In a recent decision, Harris v. Wright,79 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld a life sentence of a fifteen-year-old murderer.80 Applying the test established in Trap, the court held that the defendant had
failed to meet the "heavy burden" of showing that the statutorily permitted
sentence did not comport with society's standards of decency.81 The court
avoided defining what would satisfy the defendant's burden.8 2 The court
stated that, because the sentence was similar to that adopted by twenty-one
decided on June 14, 1968 even though the crime had been committed 10 years
earlier on August 15, 1958. See id.
78. Id. Presumably, the court was referring to Fry and McElwain, which required deference to the legislature and sentencing guidelines. See id. at 379
(Montgomery, J., dissenting) (using Fry and McElwain for proposition that punish-

ment is not cruel because legislature has provided for it). In 1968, the year that
Workman was decided, Fry was 33 years old and McElwain was 26 years old. See Fry,
82 S.W.2d 431 (decided in 1935); McElwain, 159 S.W.2d 11 (decided in 1942).
Today, Workman is more than 30 years old and may be dismissed as "ancient authority." See Workman, 429 S.W.2d at 378, 379 (Montgomery,J., dissenting) (stating
that not "a lot of attention" needs to be paid to 26-year-old decision).
79. 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996).
80. See id. at 586. In 1987, 15-year-old Harris and 13-year-old Massey entered
their victim's store with the intent to rob it. See id. at 582. Upon entering the
store, Massey shot the owner of the store. See id. The victim was shot in the head
and the stomach and had been stabbed seven times. See State v. Massey, 803 P.2d
340, 342 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). Because Harris was convicted of aggravated firstdegree murder and the State did not seek the death penalty, Harris was sentenced
to life imprisonment, which was the only available sentence under state law. See
Harris, 93 F.3d at 582; see also WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.030 (1998) (limiting
sentences for aggravated first-degree murder to death penalty or life imprisonment without parole). Massey was also convicted of aggravated first-degree murder
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. See Massey, 803 P.2d at 343.
81. See Harris,93 F.3d at 583-84 (looking to state legislation to establish standards of decency). Given the presumptive validity of a punishment that is permitted by legislation, a defendant who desires to have the punishment overturned for
failing to comport with the standards of decency bears a heavy burden of "showing
that our culture and laws emphatically and well nigh universally reject [his sentence]." Id. at 583; see Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373 (placing burden on defendant to
show that state legislation is not indicative of standards of decency).
82. See Harris,93 F.3d at 583-84 (stating that Harris bore "the burden of proving a strong legislative consensus against imposing mandatory life without parole
on offenders who commit their crimes before the age of sixteen"). Harris could
only list two states that prohibited life sentences on 15 year-olds. See id.; see also
IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3 (1996) (prohibiting life imprisonment without parole for
crimes committed under age 16); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.620 (1996) (prohibiting
life imprisonment for juveniles transferred from juvenile court to superior court).
The court concluded that, regardless of "[w ] hatever degree of consensus might be
necessary before [the court] could overturn the considered judgment of a state
legislature, [Harris didn't] come close." Harris,93 F.3d at 584.
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other states, the defendant's sentence did not violate society's standards of
83
decency.
2.

Harmelin v. Michigan: Limited Proportionality

In Harmelin v. Michigan,84 the United States Supreme Court stated
that "[t] he Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that
are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime."8 5 In Harmelin, the Court revisited many of its previous holdings to establish the correct proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment. 8 6 The Court ultimately
upheld a life sentence for possession of 672 grams of cocaine on the
grounds that a punishment is not cruel and unusual simply because it is
87

severe.

83. See Harris,93 F.3d at 584 (noting that 21 states permit life sentence on 15
year-olds); see also Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71 (stating that where majority of states
allows punishment there can be no consensus to satisfy defendant's burden in order to disprove presumption of validity).
84. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
85. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983)). The decision of the Court in
Harmelin was a plurality. See id. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion is widely
accepted as the holding of the Court. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d
123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that Justice Kennedy's opinion is "rule" of
Harmelin); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 408 (8th Cir. 1991) (adopting
Justice Kennedy's opinion); United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir.
1991) (stating thatJustice Kennedy's opinion was dispositive).
86. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997-98 (providing lengthy historical discussion of
evolution of Court's proportionality analyses). "Though [the Court's] decisions
recognize a proportionality principle, its precise contours are unclear." Id. at 998.
In Weems v. United States, the Court prohibited "greatly disproportioned" punishments. 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910). In Coker v. Georgia, the Court definitively stated
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited death as a punishment for rape. 433 U.S.
584, 585 (1977) (stating that capital punishment of rapist is unconstitutional because rapist "does not unjustifiably take human life"). Later, the Court extended
its holding in Coker to prohibit capital punishment for a felony-murder conviction,
where the defendant lacked the intent to kill. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
801 (1982) (holding that courts may not impose capital punishment absent showing of "intent to kill").
In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Court "acknowledged the existence of the proportionality rule for both capital and noncapital cases." Harmelin,
501 U.S. at 997 (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 271-74, 274 n. 1). In Hutto v. Davis, 454
U.S. 370 (1982), the Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment may provide
for a proportionality review of noncapital sentences but failed to establish such a
review because the Court determined that any such review was inapplicable to the
sentence in the case. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (citing Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3
(stating that proportionality review may be appropriate in noncapital context)).
Lastly, the Court in Harmelinlooked to its recent decision in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277 (1983). See id. at 997-98. In Solem, the Court held that a life sentence was
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime committed. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 280
(holding that life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment for recidivism based
on seven underlying nonviolent felonies).
87. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95. The Court distinguished between severe
and cruel punishments and noted that, outside the context of capital punishment,
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Severity is nowhere more apparent in the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis than in: the capital context, which the Court has often
distinguished from punishments in the noncapital context. 88 "[T]he
Supreme Court has addressed the Eighth Amendment implications of capital sentencing of juveniles and [has] held that the juvenile status of a
criminal defendant weighs heavily in the proportionality equation." 89 The
Court, however, has not addressed the implications of a juvenile's age in
the proportionality analysis of noncapital sentences. 90
In Harmelin,Justice Kennedy indicated that the Supreme Court would
invalidate a legislatively based prison term only in "extreme circumstances;" but Justice Kennedy did not define what would qualify as "exproportionality challenges will rarely be successful. See id. at 1001 (refusing to apply strict proportionality test to Eighth Amendment challenges outside of capital
context); Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90 (same). "[L]ack of objective standards to distinguish between sentences for different terms of years" poses a significant problem
of determining proportionality. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (giving reasons why
strict proportionality is improper); Solem, 463 U.S. at 294 ("It is clear that a 25-year
sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year sentence, but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the Eighth Amendment while
the latter does not.").
88. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995-97 (noting different requirements under
Eighth Amendment for capital and noncapital sentencing). The Court has so held
because "[t]he death penalty differs from all other forms of criminal punishment,
not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
89. Recent Case, Eighth Amendment-Juvenile Sentencing-Ninth Circuit Upholds
Life Sentence Without Possibility of Parole of Fifteen-Year-Old Murderer.--Harris v.
Wright, 93F.3d581 (9th Cir. 1996), 110 HARv. L. REV. 1185, 1185 (1997) [hereinafter Ninth Circuit Upholds]. The Supreme Court has established a minimum age for
the death penalty at 16 years old. Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989) (holding that Eighth Amendment does not prohibit death penalty for 16and 17-year-old offenders), with Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
(holding that Eighth Amendment prohibits death penalty for 15-year-old offenders). In Thompson, the Court stated that the execution of a 15-year-old was "generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community." Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832.
The Court based this finding on the idea that "less culpability should attach to a
crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an
adult," adding that "the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our
law, dictate that the normal 15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult." Id. at 824-25.
In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court expressly stated that "the chronological age
of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight" in Eighth Amendment analysis of sentencing juveniles. 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982). The Court in
Eddings, however, was addressing the issue in the capital context. See id. (hearing
appeal of 16-year-old murderer sentenced to death). For a discussion of the role
of age in capital sentencing, see generally Sherri Jackson, Note, Too Young to DieJuveniles and the Death Penalty-A Better Alternative to Killing Our Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 391 (1996).
90. See Ninth Circuit Upholds, supra note 89, at 1185 (noting Court's failure to
address "effect ofjuvenile status within the context of noncapital sentencing"); see
also Streib, supra note 46, at 431-32 (discussing lack of minimum age for life
imprisonment).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss4/5

16

Morrissey: Do the Adult Crime, Do the Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel and
1999]

NoTE

723

treme circumstances." 91 In Harris,however, the Ninth Circuit refused to
accept the defendant's argument that his young age qualified as an "extreme circumstance [ ]" requiring a holding that his life sentence was cruel
92
and unusual.
In State v. Massey,93 the Washington Court of Appeals refused to consider age a mitigating factor in sentencing a thirteen-year-old to life imprisonment. 94 The Massey court simply deferred to the legislation that
provided for the life sentence. 95 Massey, however, was a case involving a
may require a
thirteen-year-old murderer; society's standards of decency
96
different outcome for a thirteen-year-old sex offender.
III.

STATE V. GPF&Aw: FACTS

On July 27, 1994, Andre Demetrius Green broke into his victim's
home. 97 Green had been harassing his victim for six weeks and had selected this night to attack her. 98 Green approached the victim with a
91. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Ninth Circuit
Upholds, supra note 89, at 1188 (questioning what could constitute "extreme
circumstances").
92. See Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 585 (1996) (upholding life sentence for
15 year-old). The court rejected the defendant's argument that a life sentence for
a 15-year-old murderer was "grossly disproportionate" because of his young age.
See id. at 584 (refusing to consider defendant's age as controlling). The court emphatically stated, 'Youth has no obvious bearing on [proportionality]: If we can
discern no clear line for adults, neither can we for youths." Id. at 585.
93. 803 P.2d 340 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
94. See id. at 348 (refusing to consider defendant's age in proportionality review of sentence). Massey was 13 years old when he entered his victim's store with
Harris, the defendant in Harris v. Wright. See id. at 34243. Massey shot his victim
twice. See id. at 342. Massey was convicted of aggravated first-degree murder and
was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. See id. On appeal, Massey argued that his sentence violated his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment because he was only 13 years old. See id.
at 348.
Where the defendant is an adult, a life sentence without the possibility of
parole for aggravated first-degree murder is not cruel and unusual punishment.
See State v. Forrester, 587 P.2d 179 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). Here, the Washington
Court of Appeals upheld the life sentence by concluding that "there is no cause to
create a distinction between a juvenile and an adult who are sentenced to life without parole for first degree aggravated murder." Massey, 803 P.2d at 348.
Both the Washington Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United
States declined to hear defendant's argument that his life sentence was cruel and
unusual because he was only 13 years old. See Massey v. Washington, 499 U.S. 960
(1991) (denying petition for writ of certiorari); State v. Massey, 802 P.2d 126
(Wash. 1990) (denying petition for review).
95. See Massey 803 P.2d at 348 (deferring to state legislation and noting that
juvenile court was justified in finding that juvenile system provided insufficient
penalties for heinous crime).
96. See id. (limiting decision to sentencing of murderers).
97. See State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 823 (N.C. 1998). After banging on the
victim's back door, Green broke the window and forcibly entered her home. See id.
98. See id. at 822.
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99
weapon, knocked her down and proceeded to sexually molest her.
Green also physically abused his victim before fleeing the scene. 10 0 Green
was promptly identified as the assailant and charged with first-degree sexual offense. 10 1 At the time of the attack, Green was only thirteen years
10 2
old.
Just months before the attack, section 7A-608 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which establishes the minimum age for transfer of
juveniles to superior court, had been amended.10 3 The North Carolina
legislature voted to lower the minimum age for transferring juveniles to
superior court from fourteen to thirteen. 10 4 The legislature amended the
statute in response to the growing concern over the increasing incidence
of violent crimes being committed by juveniles. 10 5 The amended section
7A-610 went into effect on May 1, 1994.106 Thus, the statute permitting
transfer of thirteen-year-old juveniles was in effect when Green committed
10 7
his crimes.
The attorneys for the State petitioned the district court to order a
transfer as authorized by section 7A-610. 10 8 Upon a showing of probable
cause, the district court granted the petition and transferred Green from
juvenile court to superior court to be tried as an adult.' 0 9 The district

99. See id. at 823. Green entered the bedroom of his twenty-three-year-old
victim with a mop handle, swung the weapon at his victim and then knocked her

onto the bed and then to the floor. See id. Green fondled the victim's breasts,
performed oral sex upon her and penetrated her vagina with his penis and finger.
See id. Moreover, Green threatened further harm during the attack. See id.
100. See id. (noting that Green repeatedly slapped his victim leaving her
bruised and scarred).
101. See id. Two witnesses identified Green as the person fleeing the victim's
home and the victim, herself, later identified Green in a police line-up. See id.
Green was charged in juvenile petitions with first-degree sexual offense, first-degree burglary and first-degree rape. See id. at 822. Green was ultimately convicted
of first-degree burglary, first-degree sexual offense and attempted first-degree rape
in superior court under the adult criminal system. See id. Because only the conviction for first-degree sexual offense carried a mandatory life sentence, it is the focus
of this Note. See id.
102. See id. at 822.
103. See id. at 825-26 (citing Crime Control Act of 1994, ch. 22, § 25, 1993
N.C. Sess. Laws (Extra Session 1994) 62, 75 as setting minimum age for transfer at
13 (effective May 1, 1994)).
104. See id.; see also Crime Control Act of 1994, ch. 22, § 25, 1993 N.C. Sess.
Laws (Extra Session 1994) 62, 75.
105. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 830. For a discussion of the impetus for lowering
the minimum age of transfer, see infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
106. See id. at 825-26.
107. See id. at 822, 825-26.
108. See id. at 822. For crimes other than Class A felonies, North Carolina
follows the petition method for adjudicating juveniles as adults. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7A-608,-610 (1997) (providing petition as transfer mechanism for juvenile
judges). For a discussion of the petition method of transferring juveniles to adult
court and other transfer mechanisms, see infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
109. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822 (stating that probable cause hearing was held
on August 18, 1994 in accordance with N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-608 to -612 (1997)).
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judge found that transfer would best serve the needs of the juvenile and
the interests of the State. 110 In addition, the district judge cited the following factors that influenced the decision to issue the transfer order: (1)
the serious nature of the crime, (2) the victim was a stranger to Green, (3)
the community's need to be protected from serious criminal activity, (4)
Green's history of assaultive behavior, and (5) strong evidence of probable
cause based on Green's own statements. 1 1 '
In January 1995, Green was tried by a jury in superior court and convicted of first-degree sexual offense. 112 The superior court sentenced
Green to life imprisonment.' 1 3 At the time that Green committed the
crime, section 14-1.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes imposed a
mandatory life sentence on persons convicted of this crime. 1 14 Although
the mandatory life sentence for first-degree sexual offense had been replaced with discretionary sentencing guidelines during the same session in
which the North Carolina legislature lowered the minimum age for transfer, the discretionary sentencing guidelines did not take effect until October 1, 1994.115 Green attacked his victim on July 27, 1994.116 Therefore,
the superior court had no discretion in sentencing and was required by
7
law to sentence Green to life imprisonment."1
Green's history of assaultive behavior, his confession to police officers and his subsequent denials provided the basis for the finding of probable cause. See id. (noting factors to which juvenile court looked to find probable cause).
110. See id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-610(c) (requiring statement of reasons for transfer in transfer order).
111. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822. The criminal statute provides:
A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the first degree if the person
engages in a sexual act... (2) [w]ith another person by force and against
the will of the other person, and ...
a. [e]mploys or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or ... b.
[i]nflicts serious personal injury upon the victim.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4 (1997). Because the allegations indicated that the statutory requirements would be satisfied, the court could have properly found probable cause and a societal desire to try Green as an adult. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at
822-24.
112. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822.
113. See id.
114. See id. At the time of the attack, section 14-1.1 read, "A Class B felony
shall be punishable by life imprisonment." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1 (repealed effectiveJan. 1, 1995). Green was convicted of first-degree sexual offense which is a
Class B felony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4(b) (1997).
115. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834 (Frye, J., dissenting). Section 14-1.1 was replaced by discretionary sentencing guidelines. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.10
to -1340.38 (1997). Section 15A-1340.10 restricts the discretionary guidelines to
crimes occurring "on or after October 1, 1994." Id. § 15A-1340.10. Within the
sentencing guidelines, life imprisonment is only mandated for first-degree murder.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (1997) (requiring that first-degree murder be
punished with nothing less than life imprisonment).
116. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823.
117. See id. at 834-35 (Frye, J., dissenting) (stating that because legislature,
and not judiciary, is charged with determining "extent of punishment which may
be imposed," court was not permitted to weigh any mitigating circumstances in
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The interplay between the amendment of section 7A-610, which lowered the minimum age of transfer to thirteen, and the repeal of section
14-1.1, which mandated a life sentence for first-degree sexual offense, resulted in only a five-month period during which a thirteen-year-old could
be tried in superior court, convicted of first-degree sexual offense and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. 1 8 By happenstance, Green was
the only thirteen-year-old during this five-month period to be transferred
to superior court and convicted of first-degree sexual offense.1 19 Green is,
therefore, the only thirteen-year-old first-degree sexual offender subjected
120
to a mandatory life sentence in North Carolina.
On appeal, Green challenged the validity of section 7A-610 on the
ground that it violated his Fifth Amendment right of due process by failing
to provide specific guidelines for the district judge to follow in determin121
ing whether to grant the State's petition for transfer to superior court.
Green also challenged his sentence on the ground that sentencing a
thirteen-year-old to life imprisonment for a first-degree sexual offense violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
122
punishment.

IV.
A.
1.

ANALYSIS

State v. Green: NarrativeAnalysis

North Carolina Upholds Transfer Statute Because Statutory Scheme Provides
Sufficient Guidelines to ProtectJuvenile's Due Process
Section 7A-610 permits the transfer of juveniles to superior court

upon petition from the State if the judge determines that "the needs of
the juvenile or the best interest of the State will be served by transfer of the
case to superior court for trial as in the case of adults.' 23 Green asserted
that section 7A-610 was "unconstitutionally vague because it provides no
meaningful guidance to juvenile courtjudges."1 24 Green claimed that this
vagueness violated his due process because, with insufficient guidance,
attempt to determine whether lesser sentence was more appropriate) (quoting
State v. Cradle, 188 S.E.2d 296, 303 (N.C. 1972)).
118. See id. at 833.
119. See id. ("[Because Green] was the only thirteen-year-old to commit firstdegree sexual offense during this 'window,' to have his case subsequently transferred to superior court, and to be convicted of the crime, he is the only thirteenyear-old who will be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment under
this statutory scheme as it existed.").
120. See id. (stating that fact that Green is only 13- year-old to face mandatory
life imprisonment is merely coincidence and does not meet constitutional definition of "unusual").
121. See id. at 821-22 (setting forth Green's due process challenge of N.C.
GEN. STAT.

§ 7A-610 (1997)).

122. See id. (discussing Green's Eighth Amendment challenge to life
sentence).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1997).
124. Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823.
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transfers were "arbitrary" and "discriminatory." 125 Green also contended
that the statute violated his due process because the purpose of the juve1 26
nile justice system is to rehabilitate.
Green argued that section 7A-610 offers no specific criteria to be considered by the judge ordering the transfer and, at most, provides only a
balancing test between the needs of the juvenile and the interest of the
state. 127 Green cited the United States Supreme Court decision in Kent,
which enumerated eight criteria for courts to consider when transferring
juveniles to superior court, as the basis for holding that section 7A-610
violated his due process. 128 The court, nonetheless, determined that section 7A-610 did not violate due process because, when read as a part of the
larger statutory scheme, it provided judges with sufficient guidelines to
129
consider when transferring juveniles.
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that section 7A-608 requires a preliminary hearing and a finding of probable cause before a
juvenile may be transferred. 1 30 Also, ajudge cannot order the transfer of
13 1
a juvenile unless the alleged crime is statutorily defined as a felony.
The court also noted that the juvenile code provided other criteria in its
general purpose: "[t] o develop a disposition in each juvenile case that reflects consideration of the facts, the needs and limitation of the child, the
125. See id.; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)
(requiring statute to contain "sufficiently definite criteria to govern court's exercise of discretion").
126. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823 (citing Green's argument that North Carolina's juvenile justice system was founded on rehabilitative ideal).
127. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-610 (1997) (requiring transferring judge to balance interests of juvenile and society but failing to list criteria to be considered).
For a discussion of the merits of Green's claim that § 7A-610 fails to provide sufficient criteria to guide juvenile judges' decisions, see infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
128. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 826-27 (noting Green's reliance on Kent to challenge constitutionality of § 7A-610). For a discussion of the Kent factors, see supra
notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
129. See id. at 826-28 (pointing to various sections in juvenile code that supply
additional criteria that may aid judge in decision whether to transfer juvenile to
superior court or to retain jurisdiction of case in juvenile system).
130. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1997) (stating that "[t]he court after notice, hearing, and a finding of probable cause may transfer jurisdiction over ajuvenile to superior court" and establishing 13 as minimum age of transfer).
131. See id. (permitting transfer of only those juveniles who have committed
what would, but for their age, be classified as felony). A juvenile may be transferred on charges of first-degree sexual offense because first-degree sexual offense
is a Class BI felony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4 (1997) (classifying first-degree
sexual offense as Class B1 felony). Importantly, juvenile judges are denied discretion where the juvenile has been charged with first-degree murder because § 7A608 requires transfer of alleged offenders who have obtained the age of thirteen
and are charged with a class A felony. See id. §§ 7A-608, 14-17 (requiring transfer
of juveniles charged with first-degree murder).
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strengths and weaknesses of the family, and the protection of the public
safety."

132

The court further concluded that section 7A-610 supplied a sufficient
test and that the overall juvenile code constrained ajudge contemplating
transfer of a juvenile to superior court so as to protect against arbitrary
and discriminatory transfers. 13 3 Accordingly, the court upheld section 7A610 against Green's vagueness challenge despite its lack of enumerated
criteria as suggested in Kent.13 4 Moreover, the court concluded that the
judge who ordered the transfer complied with the guidelines provided by
the overall juvenile code and the balancing test as explicitly stated in sec35
tion 7A-610.1
2.

Life Imprisonment of a Thirteen-Year-Old Sex Offender Is Severe But Not
Cruel and Unusual

In his appeal, Green argued that his life sentence violated both the
North Carolina and the federal prohibitions of cruel and unusual punishment. 13 6 Green maintained that sentencing a thirteen-year-old to life im132. Green, 502 S.E.2d at 825 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-516(3)). The court
also referenced § 7A-646, which points to criteria for the exercise of discretion by
judges in juvenile actions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-646 (1997) ("[T]he judge shall
select the least restrictive disposition [of the juvenile case] both in terms of kind
and duration, that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, the degree of
culpability indicated by the circumstances ...and prior record of the juvenile.").
Section 7A-646 applies only to judges in the course of a juvenile action and refers

to committing juveniles to "training schools" or disposition through other "community-level resources." See id. (limiting its application to judges in midst of juvenile actions and not to transfers). Thus, the judge, who ordered the transfer of
Green to superior court, was not constrained by the criteria provided in § 7A-646.
See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 825.
133. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 825 (holding that "section 7A-610 in light of the
entire juvenile and criminal codes establishes that [section 7A-610] provides juvenile courtjudges with sufficient guidance and criteria by which to make discretionary transfer rulings").
134. See id. at 827 (stating that lack of enumerated criteria in § 7A-610 did not
invalidate it as violative of due process because Supreme Court's holding in Kent
did not go as far as to require inclusion of enumerated criteria in state transfer
statutes). Rather the United States Supreme Court was "merely exercising its supervisory role over [an] inferior court" and, therefore, the criteria have no binding
effect on the North Carolina statute or Supreme Court. Id.
135. See id. at 822 (noting that juvenile judge based her judgment on seriousness of sexual offense, community's interest in being protected from serious crime
and Green's bad temper and history of assaultive behavior in school). The criteria
listed were sufficient to demonstrate that the transfer had not been made arbitrarily. See id. at 827 (finding that juvenile code provides sufficient protection against
arbitrary transfers).
136. See id. at 828. Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution
mirrors the language of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
except that Section 27 prohibits "cruel or unusual punishments." N.C. CONST. art.
I, § 27 (emphasis added). The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishment. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII (emphasis added). The distinction is noted but has had no impact on analysis; the North
Carolina Supreme Court historically has analyzed questions of cruel and/or unu-
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prisonment was cruel and unusual because it did not comport with
society's standards of decency.1 3 7 The court found that the life sentence
did not violate society's standards of decency because the minimum age of
transfer was lowered in response to community outcries over the increased
number of violent crimes being committed by juveniles and the need for
deterring such crimes.13 8 The court pointed to these public outcries and
sual punishments the same way under both the federal and state constitutions. See,
e.g., State v. Bronson, 423 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 1992) (analyzing both state and federal
provisions similarly regardless of "and/or" difference); State v. Rogers, 374 S.E.2d
852 (N.C. 1989) (same); State v. Higginbottom, 324 S.E.2d 834 (N.C. 1985)
(same).
137. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 828 (setting forth Green's challenge to his sentence as not meeting standard established in Trop). Actually, Green presented
three reasons for why the North Carolina Supreme Court should find that his life
sentence was unconstitutional. See id. at 827-28. Green's first argument was that
his life sentence "does not comport with current societal standards of decency."
Id. at 828. Secondly, Green argued that life imprisonment was disproportionate to
a first-degree sexual offense. See id. North Carolina has repeatedly held that "a
mandatory life sentence for first-degree sexual offense is not cruel and unusual
punishment" under either the state constitution or federal Constitution. State v.
Holley, 388 S.E.2d 110, 111 (N.C. 1990) (holding that life sentence for first-degree
sexual offense is not so grossly disproportionate as to violate federal and state
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Spaugh, 364 S.E.2d
368, 373 (N.C. 1988) (same); State v. Cooke, 351 S.E.2d 290, 293 (N.C. 1987)
(same); Higginbottom, 324 S.E.2d 834, 837 (N.C. 1985) (same).
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has not drawn a distinction between "cruel" and "unusual." See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 n.32 (1958). "On
the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been
drawn." Id.; see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 376-78 (1910) (drawing no
significant difference between two words "and" and "or").
Third, Green argued that his sentence was cruel and unusual because the
elimination of the mandatory life sentence for first-degree sexual offenses and the
adoption of sentencing guidelines result in Green being the only thirteen year-old
sex offender who will be sentenced to life in North Carolina. See Green, 502 S.E.2d
at 828. The Court dismissed this contention as irrelevant. See id. at 833. "Unusual" in the sense that it is used in the state and federal constitutions does not refer
to the number of occurrences. See id. at 828. Rather, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits punishments that are disproportionate or barbaric. See Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976). "In determining whether a punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment, the Court simply examines the particular punishment involved in
light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without the subtleties of
meaning that might be latent in the word unusual." Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 n.32.
138. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 828-31 (reporting that social outrage spurred
concern regarding juvenile violence and resulted in lowering of minimum age for
transfer).
During the legislative session, North Carolina's governor, city officials and
many others raised concerns about the increase in juvenile violent offenses. See
generally Verbatim Transcript,Public Hearings before Senate of the N.C. GeneralAssembly
Sitting as a Committee of the Whole in Extra Session on Crime, Feb. 8-9, 1994, Raleigh,
N.C. (printed in N.C. SENATE JouRNAL, Extra Session 1994) [hereinafter Verbatim
Transcript]. A local mayor complained that "[t] he current juvenile justice code
[was] hopelessly outdated." Id. at 249. District Court Judge Margaret Sharpe added, "It's not unusual to see 11-12-13-year-olds committing rape and other serious
sexual assaults." Id. at 328.
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bolstering statistics that show a drastic increase in juvenile violence as rep139
resentative of the contemporary standards of decency.
The court reasoned that "[t]he clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the [state]
legislature[ ]."1140 A dissenting opinion agreed but asserted that the repeal
of the mandatory life sentence for first-degree sexual offense was evidence
that the life sentence did violate the standards of decency. 1 ' The dissent
scoffed at the majority's claim that, by lowering the minimum age to thirteen, the legislature justified the life sentence because "[b]y eliminating
the mandatory life sentence for all defendants convicted of [first-degree
sexual offense], the legislature cannot realistically be deemed to have specifically intended that thirteen-year-old juveniles be suddenly subject to
mandatory life terms during the five-month period of 1 May to 1 October
1994."142

Accordingly, the court concluded that "the general consensus of the people
through their elected representatives was that violent youthful offenders were a
substantial threat to the security and well-being of society, and they must be dealt
with in a more severe manner." Green, 502 S.E.2d at 830. Accordingly, the court
held that the imposition of a life sentence on a thirteen-year-old was "within the
bounds of society's current and evolving standards of decency." Id. at 831.
139. See generally N.C. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA UNIFORM CRIME REPORT

1994 (1995) (reporting juvenile crime statistics).

From 1984 to 1993, the number of violent crimes committed by juveniles under
the age of fifteen increased by more than 249%. See id. at 155-57. Remarkably, in
1997, North Carolina saw 569 arrests of 13 and 14 year-olds for violent crimes. See
STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, N.C.,JUVENILE ARRESTS BY AGE 1997, (visited October 3, 1998) <http://sbi.jus.state.nc.us/ crimstat/crimenc/juvart97.pdf>. Of the
569 arrests, 103 were arrests of 13 and 14 year-olds for sexual offenses and 120 for
forcible rape. See id.; see also N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA: INITIAL REPORT OF 1997 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING DATA, 5 (Apr. 1998) (indicating that arrests of juveniles for violent crimes has

increased by over 150% since 1987).
140. Green, 502 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting Peny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331

(1989)); see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (stating that primary
indicia of society's standard of decency is found in enactment of that society's
elected representatives).
141. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834-35 (Frye, J., dissenting) (arguing that life
imprisonment of 13-year-old sex offender did not comport with standards of decency in North Carolina as evidenced by repeal of life sentence required by § 141.1). The repeal of all mandatory sentences for offenses other than first-degree

murder took place during the same session of the General Assembly during which
the minimum age was reduced from 14 to 13; and, as such, this repeal demonstrates that society's standards do not subject first-degree sex offenders to
mandatory life imprisonment. See id. at 835 (Frye, J., dissenting) (arguing that
majority misinterprets society's standards of decency). Judge Frye urges that this
repeal also be considered "'reliable[,] objective evidence of contemporary values.'" Id. (Frye, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331
(1989)).

142. Id. at 835. Green was a "borderline mentally retarded juvenile." Id.
Judge Frye applied similar reasoning as did Judge Calogero in his dissent in State v.
Foley, 456 So.2d 979 (La. 1984). There, Judge Calogero wrote:
I am not unmindful of the fact that the statutory penalty for aggravated

rape is mandatory, and the trial judge, by statute, is afforded no discre-
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The majority noted that a life sentence for a thirteen-year-old was severe but not "cruel and unusual. 1 43 The court justified the sentence by
stating that the predatory attack was not of the kind normally attributable
to a thirteen-year-old and, thus, Green was not a suitable candidate for
144
rehabilitation in the juvenile system.

B.
1.

CriticalAnalysis

Due Process: Statute, Not Transfer, Violates Due Process Clause

Green argued that North Carolina's transfer statute, section 7A-610,
violated his due process because section 7A-610 does not list the Kent factors for consideration by the transferring judge. 145 Nowhere in Kent did
the Supreme Court mandate that state transfer statutes incorporate the
tion in sentencing the defendant. However, that does not absolve this
Court (or any appellate court) of its duty to enforce an individual's constitutional right against excessive punishment on appellate review of his
sentence.
Id. at 990 n.6 (Calogero, J., dissenting). Green and Foley were both limited in
their mental capacity and came from poor family situations. See id. at 989 (finding
that juvenile had limited mental capacity and was poor); Green, 502 S.E.2d at 83435 (Frye, J., dissenting) (finding that juvenile had limited mental capacity and
came from poor, dysfunctional home in which father constantly viewed
pornography).
143. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834 (citing State v. Fulcher, 243 S.E.2d 338, 352
(N.C. 1978)).
144. See id. at 832 ("While the chronological age of a defendant is a factor...,
the Court's review is not limited to this factor."). Age is not simply chronological;
other factors such as the severity of the crime demonstrate that "the number of
years a defendant has spent on this planet" are not determinative of one's age.
State v. Oliver, 307 S.E.2d 304, 333 (1983). Green had harassed and preyed on his
victim for six weeks. See id. at 822, 832. Green violently attacked his victim in front
of her 20-month-old son. See id. at 832. Moreover, Green relented his attack only
after the police arrived and, even then, continued the attack until the last moment
before fleeing. See id.
The alternative of adjudicating Green as a juvenile was insufficient. See id.
(recognizing that had Green been tried as juvenile, he would have been subject to
only four years of incarceration and that rehabilitation would be ineffective because Green was not typical juvenile sex offender to whom rehabilitative programs
are geared). For a discussion of the general characteristics ofjuvenile sex offenders and their crimes, see infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text; Earl F. Martin
& Marsha Kline Pruett, TheJuvenile Sex Offender and theJuvenileJustice System, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 279, 294-303 (1998) (providing profile ofjuvenile sex offenders and
patterns of offenses).
145. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 826-27 (finding against Green on his contention
that § 7A-610 was unconstitutional because it failed to include Kent factors). In
fact, § 7A-610 does not adopt the Kent factors. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-610 (1997)
(providing simple balancing test rather than express criteria). Instead, § 7A-610
only requires the juvenile judge to determine whether transfer will serve "the
needs of the juvenile or the best interest of the State." Id.
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eight factors. 1 4 6 Therefore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was cor147
rect in dismissing this contention.
What the Due Process Clause does require is that a statute provide
"sufficiently definite criteria" to govern a court's exercise of discretion. 148
Section 7A-610 does not provide even one explicit criterion but instead
offers a balancing test between the "needs of the juvenile" and the "best
interest of the State.

1 49

To satisfy this requirement of sufficiently definite criteria, many states
have heeded the warning in Kent and have specifically included the Kent
factors in their transfer statutes. 150 In fact, many state statutes offer more
guidance than section 7A-610. 151 In Kent, the Supreme Court acknowledged that states' statutory schemes dealing with the transfer of juveniles
would inevitably vary, but this variance does not excuse North Carolina's
duty to provide due process protection for juveniles. 152 Section 7A-610's
balancing test falls significantly short in supplying standards for transfer
decisions.
146. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 565-667 (1966) (stating that holding was directed to specific Judge of Juvenile Court of District of Columbia and
enumerating Kent factors for specific Judge to consider on remand).
147. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 827 ("[T]he Supreme Court [of the United
States] nowhere stated in Kent that the above factors were constitutionally
required.").
148. Id. at 823 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
The Supreme Court of the United States has warned against unbridled discretion:
"Discretion without a criterion for its exercise is authorization of arbitrariness."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 496 (1953). Vagueness often violates constitutional
values. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (stating that vague laws offend several important values). First, vague laws fail to provide the opportunity for reasonable citizens to discern what is lawful behavior. See id. (requiring statute to be clear so
citizens know what activity is prohibited). This is not pertinent to Green because
§ 7A-610 is not the kind of statute that prohibits conduct. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-610 (1997) (providing mechanism by which juvenile judges may transfer
juveniles to adult court). Moreover, Green did not raise this issue on appeal. See
Green, 502 S.E.2d at 824-25 (noting that appeal claims vagueness for insufficient
guidance to judges, not insufficient warning to citizens).
Secondly, as stated by the Court in Grayned, vagueness violates important values by failing to provide judges and juries with adequate standards upon which
they can base their decisions. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (requiring statutes to
provide sufficient criteria to ensure proper guidance in exercise of discretion).
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-610;
150. See Martin & Pruett, supra note 144, at 326 (stating that many jurisdictions model their transfer statutes after Kent factors). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 985.226(3) (c) (West 1998) (adopting all eight Kent Factors).
151. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.45(8) (1997) (providing only three guidelines). The Iowa juvenile code only requires that the juvenile judge consider (1)
the nature of the alleged crime and the surrounding circumstances, (2) the juvenile's prior history and (3) the availability of rehabilitative programs. See id.
152. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1975) (noting importance of
transfer process to juvenile system as indicated in Kent and stating that "the statutory provisions differ in numerous details. Whatever their differences, however,
such transfer provisions represent an attempt to impart to the juvenile-court system the flexibility needed to deal with youthful offenders...").
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Section 7A-610 lacks the specificity of most states' transfer statutes,
which explicitly enumerate factors to be considered in transferring
juveniles to adult court. 15 3 The Supreme Court of North Carolina may
not compensate for section 7A-610's failure to enumerate specific criteria
by looking at other provisions of the juvenile code. 154 The fact that the
juvenile judge considered some of the Kent factors supports a finding that
Green's individual due process rights were not violated; it does not, how1 55
ever, mask the fact that section 7A-610 violates the Due Process Clause.
a.

Vagueness vs. Ambiguity: The Green Court Incorrectly Looked to the
Statutory Scheme

The Green court did not address the due process challenge of "vagueness" when it looked to other statutes in North Carolina's juvenile code
156
and concluded that they provided sufficient protection of due process.
In what it considered to be its answer to the vagueness challenge, the court
incorrectly cited a canon of construction that states: "where the language
of a statute is arguably ambiguous ....courts must give effect to legislative
intent by reference . . .to statutes ...

157
having a common purpose."

153. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(d) (1998) (listing six factors, all of which
must be considered); Aiz. REv. STAT. § 8-239(D) (listing eight factors that shall be
considered); CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(e) (3) (1998) (adding five criteria in
1994 that must be considered in transferring juvenile on counts of reckless murder); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-2-518(4)(b) (1998) (listing 14 factors that court shall
consider); 10 DEL. CODE ANN. § 1010(C) (1) (listing six factors that court shall consider); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307(E) (1998) (adopting all eight Kent factors that
courts shall consider); IDAHO CODE § 20-508(8) (1998) (listing seven factors that
court shall consider); 730 ILL. COMp. STAT. § 5/3-10-7 (West 1998) (listing five factors that court shall consider); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 6(h) (West
1998) (listing six factors that court shall consider); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1269.1(A) (4) (Michie 1998) (listing 10 factors that court shall consider).
154. For a discussion of the strict vagueness test, see infra notes 156-63 and
accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the juvenile judge's adherence to the Kent factors, see
infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.

156. See State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 825-26 (N.C. 1998) (discussing statutory guidance provided to juvenile judges). The court in Green held that the juvenile code provided sufficient guidance, by which juvenile judges are to make
discretionary transfer decisions, through an "examination of section 7A-610 in
light of the entirejuvenile and criminal codes." Id. at 825 (emphasis added). Section
7A-516(3) requires disposition of a juvenile case after a consideration of: (1) the

facts; (2) the "needs and limitations of the child;" (3) the juvenile's family situation; and (4) the threat to the public. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-516(3) (1997).
Section 7A-646 states that the juvenile court "shall select the least restrictive dispo-

sition ...that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, the degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case and the age and prior
record of the juvenile." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-646 (1998); see Green, 502 S.E.2d at
825 (noting that juvenile judge's discretion was not absolute because code limits
it) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-646). The court also considered § 7A-608, that
requires notice, a hearing and a finding of probable cause. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-608 (1998); see also Green, 502 S.E.2d at 825 (stating that § 7A-610 must be

read in conjunction with § 7A-608).
157. Green, 502 S.E.2d at 825.
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The Court's holding that section 7A-610 does not violate the Due Process Clause rests wholly on its incorrect assumption that "vague" in a due
process analysis is synonymous with "ambiguity." 158 Because the Due Process Clause prohibits statutes that are vague, but not statutes that are
merely ambiguous, the court's ambiguous analysis is irrelevant to Green's
159
due process challenge.
Under similar circumstances in United States v. Sielaf 160 the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois struck down an Illinois transfer
statute as vague "because [the statute] was devoid of any guidelines or
standards for decision."1 61 The State argued that reading the transfer statute together with another portion of the juvenile statutory scheme provided sufficient guidelines

for the judges to follow. 1 6 2

The

court

158. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 79, 1549 (6th ed. 1990) (defining ambiguous and vague). The Vagueness Doctrine originates under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and requires "definite standards to guide discretionary actions." Id. at 1549. Vague is defined as "[i]ndefinite. Uncertain; not
susceptible of being understood." Id. at 1549. Ambiguity is defined as "doubleness
of meaning." Id. at 79. It follows, therefore, that something that is vague cannot
be understood at all while something that is ambiguous can be understood in at
least two ways. See id. at 79, 1549. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 7.8, at 454 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing differences between "vagueness" and
"ambiguity").
Vagueness is defined as not including a "neatly bounded class" while
"[a] mbiguity is an entirely distinct concept." Id. at 454; seeJeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some PhilosophicalIssues, 82 CAL. L. REv. 509, 512 (1994)
(stating that "ambiguity" is distinct from "vagueness" for purposes of due process
analysis). Section 7A-610 would be ambiguous if it offered guidelines that could
have two different connotations at the same time. See id. Here, § 7A-610 lacks any
guidelines; and, therefore, it violates the Due Process Clause for its vagueness because the criteria that may be used in transferring juveniles are not defined in a
"neatly bounded class." See id. at 513; see also FARNSWORTH, supra, § 7.8, at 454
(defining vagueness).
159. See United States v. Trout, 68 F.3d 1276, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 1995) (addressing vagueness challenge to Due Process Clause and ambiguity argument for
use of Rule of Lenity separately). The Court of Appeals in Trout stated that the
proper analysis of a statute challenged under the Due Process Clause was for
vagueness and not ambiguity. See id. at 1280 (accepting Fifth Circuit's reasoning
that criminal statute was not vague despite its ambiguity); see also Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 579-80 (1974) (refusing to look to other provisions in statute to shed
light on vagueness of term "treats contemptuously" and holding that statute was
vague despite existence of specificity elsewhere).
160. 434 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1977).

161. Id. at 495. For text of the Illinois transfer statute, 37

ILL. REV. STAT.

§ 702-7(3) (1971), see supra note 41. The Sielaf court stated that the lack of standards "permit[ted] and encourage[d] an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law." Sielaf 434 F. Supp. at 496 (quoting Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972)).
162. See Sielaf 434 F. Supp. at 496. The State argued that the transfer statute
was not vague because the preface, titled "Purpose and Policy," to the Juvenile
Court Act provided sufficient guidelines to judges making transfer decisions under
the Act. See id. The preface stated:
The purpose of this Act is to secure for each minor subject hereto such
care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the moral,
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reluctantly recognized that a "statement of purpose" may be relevant but,
nonetheless, concluded that the transfer statute was vague and, thus, failed
163
to protect the defendant's due process.
Thus, even in a vagueness analysis, the court in Green may have been
permitted to look to other statutory provisions; but, the provisions cited do
1 64
As
not offer much more guidance than the preface in Sielaf offered.
the preface failed to compensate for the vagueness of the statute in Sielaf
the provisions in Green likewise fail to overcome the vagueness of section
7A-610. 165 Section 7A-610 violates the Due Process Clause because
"[n]othing prevent[s] the juvenile judge from using any criteria he de166
sire[s] no matter how arbitrary."
b.

Juvenile Court Judge in Green Protected Green's Due Process by
Applying the Kent Factors

Although section 7A-610 fails to protect juveniles' due process,
Green's individual right to due process was not violated. The Court in
Kent established precepts to which juvenile courts must adhere regardless
16 7
The Kent factors
of what the individual state's transfer statute requires.
embody these precepts; thus, all juvenile courts must strictly adhere to
them. 168 Accordingly, by adhering to the precepts enumerated in Kent
regardless of whether the transfer statute includes them in its language,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties
whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parent only
when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal ....
37 ILL. Rv. STAT. § 701-2(1) (West 1971).
163. See Sielaf 434 F. Supp. at 496 (recognizing that although statement of
purpose might "in some circumstances" provide sufficient guidelines, preface to
Illinois Act did not "compensate for the vagueness in the transfer statute").
164. CompareN.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-516(3), -608, -610, -646 (1997) (requiring
balance of societal concerns with best interest of juvenile and providing procedural safeguards), with 37 ILL. REv. STAT. § 701-2(1) (setting forth policy of juvenile code to be in best interest of juvenile, his or her family and community).
165. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (establishing that law that fails to provide explicit standards for those who apply it is void for
vagueness because it "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application").
166. Sielaf 434 F. Supp. at 496.
167. See Green v. Reynolds, 57 F.3d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that
juvenile courts "strictly adhere to the constitutional precepts announced in Kent").
The Supreme Court stated that the process by which juveniles are transferred to
superior court "'must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.'" Id. (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560 (1966)). According to
the Tenth Circuit, these essentials must be included in an adequate statement of
the reasons for the transfer. See id.
168. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-68 (setting forth sample criteria for satisfying
greater constitutional requirements of juvenile due process).
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the juvenile judge who transferred Green honored the precepts announced in Kent, thereby protecting Green's right to due process. 169
In Green, the juvenile judge considered the "serious nature of the offense," which clearly satisfies the first Kent factor. 170 Without explicitly citing the Kent factors, the juvenile judge also considered the "community's
need to be aware of [and] protected from" crimes of such serious nature,
thereby further satisfying the first Kent factor.1 7 1 By including in the transfer order the statement that a conviction was likely, the juvenile judge upheld the precepts of the fourth Kent factor: "[t] he prosecutive merit of the
complaint." 172 Furthermore, by listing Green's history of assaultive behavior as a reason for the transfer, the juvenile judge clearly weighed the seventh Kent factor: "[t] he record and previous history of the juvenile." 1 73
Although only three of the eight Kent factors can be directly attributed to the juvenile judge's statement of the reasons for Green's transfer,
the juvenile judge offers an additional reason, which arguably encompasses two more. The juvenile judge notes that the "victim [was] essentially a stranger to" Green as one of the reasons for the transfer. 1 74 The
third Kent factor states that the juvenile judge should favor transfer where
the crime has been committed against a person "especially if personal injury resulted."' 7 5 By considering the victim at all, the juvenile judge acknowledged that the offense was against a person and not against
property. 176
Because the victim was a stranger who Green had stalked, the second
Kent factor could not have been avoided.1 77 This factor, which calls for a
169. See State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 827 (N.C. 1998) (noting that upon
examining reasons for transfer given by juvenile judge, "substantially all of the
[Kent] factors .. . [were] already subjects of consideration by our juvenile court
judges in transfer determinations").
170. Id. at 822 (noting that juvenile judge who ordered transfer of Green to
superior court considered seriousness of offense); see Kent, 383 U.S. at 566 (listing
"seriousness of the alleged offense" as first Kent factor).
171. Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822; see Kent, 383 U.S. at 566 (listing protection of
community in first Kent factor).
172. Kent, 383 U.S. at 567. The juvenile judge who transferred Green to superior court noted the strong evidence against Green and Green's confession to police officers in order to establish probable cause and the likelihood of prosecution.
See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822-23.
173. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 567 (listing history of violence in seventh Kent factor); Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822 (noting defendant's history of violence as reason for
transfer).
174. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822.
175. Kent, 383 U.S. at 567.
176. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822 (acknowledging human victim). The third
Kent factor calls for juvenile judges to distinguish between cases where the crime is
committed against a person or persons and cases where the crime is committed
against property. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 567 (discussing victims). The Kent Court
stated that "greater weight" should be given to offenses against a person. See id.
(noting more serious nature of offenses against person than offenses against
property).
177. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822 (describing nature of attack).
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consideration of whether the crime was committed in a "violent, premeditated or willful manner," pervaded both the reasons listed by the transferring judge and the facts of the case. 178 Thus, although the statute is
vague, the juvenile judge did not violate Green's individual right to due
process during the transfer proceedings because the judge considered at
179
least five of the eight Kent factors.
2.

Is Life Sentence of Thirteen-Year-Old Cruel & Unusual?: Evolving
Standards of Society Permit Life Sentence of Thirteen-Year-Old

In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court of the United States established
the test for determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual: the
punishment must be measured against the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."1 80 In Green, the dissent argued that the sentence was cruel and unusual because thirty-one states did
not permit a life sentence for first-degree sexual offense.18 1 This argument, however, is irrelevant; the Supreme Court has expressly stated that a
state-imposed punishment is not unconstitutional simply because it is the
most severe permitted by all fifty states. 182 Therefore, a state-imposed
punishment will not be held unconstitutional for the sole reason that no
178. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67; see Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822 (noting thatjuvenile
judge included both violent nature of crime and bad temper in her statement of
reasons accompanying Green's transfer).
179. For a list of the Kent factors and discussion of the precepts of juvenile
justice system established by the Supreme Court, see supranotes 34-39 and accompanying text.
180. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). For a discussion of the standard
by which Eighth Amendment challenges must be measured, see supra notes 60-83
and accompanying text.
181. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834 (Frye, J., dissenting) (noting that defendant
cited 31 jurisdictions in which life sentence for first-degree sexual offense is not
permitted). Only two other states, Arizona and Iowa, have mandatory life
sentences for first-degree sexual offense. See id. (Frye, J., dissenting). And, in
Iowa, a 13-year-old is not subject to transfer. See id. (Frye, J., dissenting). Therefore, given the repeal of the mandatory life sentence in North Carolina, a 13-yearold sex offender will face a mandatory life sentence only in Arizona. See id. at 83435 (Frye, J., dissenting) (noting that North Carolina legislature modified its sentencing guidelines to remove mandatory life sentence for first-degree sexual
offense).
182. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (stating that severe punishment is not necessarily cruel and unusual); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 281 (1980) (same). "Even were we to assume that the statute employed
against [the defendant] was the most stringent found in the 50 states, that severity
hardly would render [the defendant's] punishment [unconstitutional]." Id. at
281. A state-imposed punishment is not grossly disproportionate merely because
only one state imposes such punishment. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (noting that most severe punishment among all 50 states is not
necessarily grossly disproportionate) (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281). The Court
continually reinforces this precept on the basis that "some State will always bear
the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any other State."
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,dissenting)); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282 (same).
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other state imposes a similar punishment because "[o]ur federal system
recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate societal norms
18 3
through criminal law."
Moreover, Green's young age does not lend itself to a per se ruling of
unconstitutionality.' 8 4 Once a juvenile of any age is transferred to superior court, charged with a violation of state law and convicted, the juvenile
must be "'handled in every respect as an adult."' 1 8 5 Although juvenile
courts should consider age during transfer proceedings, "[y]outh has no
obvious bearing" on cruel and unusual punishments outside of the capital
context.18 6 In fact, Justice O'Connor has warned that the Supreme Court
of the United States should not "substitute (its own] inevitably subjective
judgment about the best age at which to draw a line.., for the judgments
of [state] legislatures." 1 8 7 Thus, although age was a factor that the court
could have considered in the transfer proceeding, it is not dispositive to
18 8
the inquiry as to whether Green's life sentence is cruel and unusual.
The correct analysis of Green's life sentence is, however, an examination in light of society's standards of decency.1 89 In 1968, a life sentence
183. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)) (emphasis added). In Harmelin,Justice Kennedy

stated that the seriousness of the crime and the need for society to be protected
from such crimes eliminated any need for comparison with the sentences imposed
by other states. See id. at 1004 (refusing to compare punishments of states). But see
id. at 1019-20 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that previous decisions in Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), and Trop v. DulLes, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), did survey
other jurisdictions).
184. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 832.
185. See State, Department of Children & Families v. Morrison, 727 So. 2d
404, 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.225(1) (West
1997)).
186. See Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to weigh
chronological age heavily, if at all). Lack of bright line rules when deciding
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual for adults precludes any bright line
rules forjuveniles. See id. at 584-85 (discussing impracticality of formulating bright
line rules); see also Green, 502 S.E.2d at 832 (stating that age may be considered
during transfer proceeding but there is no bright line rule). Physical age may be
trumped by the severity of the crime and/or sophistication of the criminal. See
State v.Johnson, 346 S.E.2d 596, 624 (N.C. 1986) (stating that other factors are to
be weighed more heavily than defendant's age).
187. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's concurrence, however, is considered to be the holding for the Supreme Court of the United States in Thompson. See Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that concurring opinion that reflects "position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment[ ] on the narrowest grounds" is the opinion of the Court).
188. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 (noting that juvenile judge may consider
juvenile's age when deciding transfer); Harris,93 F.3d at 584-85 (stating that age
has no bearing on transfer decision).
189. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (setting forth "evolving standards of decency" as proper test). For a discussion of the standard by which an
Eighth Amendment challenge must be measured, see supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
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for two fourteen-year-old rapists "shock[ed] the general conscience of society." 190 Yet, in the same decision the court recognized that "the concept
[of cruel and unusual punishment] changes with the continual development of society and with sociological views concerning the punishment for
crime." 191 Society has undoubtedly changed in the past thirty years.
In Green, the court noted some of these changes as evidenced by the
increase in both the number and severity of juvenile offenses in North
1 93
Based on the
Carolina. 19 2 The same trends are occurring nationwide.
staggering statistics and both the local and national reaction to increased
juvenile violence, the North Carolina Supreme Court was justified in holding that transferring a thirteen-year-old sex offender and sentencing him
19 4
to life imprisonment comported with society's standards of decency.

190. Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
The court stated that life sentences without benefit of parole for two 14 year-olds
was "under all [ ] circumstances" cruel and unusual and "intolerable to fundamental fairness." Id. The two juveniles had been convicted of forcible rape, which is a
violent crime; yet, the court struck down their life sentences. See id. at 375-76.
191. Id. at 377.
192. See State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 829-30 (N.C. 1998) (acknowledging
statistics that reflected increase in juvenile crime). The Supreme Court of North
Carolina acknowledged the hearings before the state legislature, which presented
concerns of the public and statistics ofjuvenile violence. See id. at 829-31 (taking
judicial notice of legislative hearings). For a discussion of the public's desire for
stricter penalties, see supra notes 112-20, 137 and accompanying text.
193. SeeJEFFREY A. BuTTs ET AL., JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1994 (reporting
statistics of increased juvenile offenses and increased violent juvenile offenses);

Harris, 93 F.3d at 582 (deciding case involving 13 and 15-year-old murderers).
From 1985 to 1994, the number of offenses committed by a juvenile against a person increased 93%. See BUTTS ET AL., supra at 5 (noting dramatic increase in offenses against person, defined as "criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, simple assault, and other person offenses" with "other person
offenses" defined as kidnaping, violent sex acts other than forcible rape, reckless
endangerment and others). See id. at 58-59 (listing comprehensive list of other
offense against persons and including "attempts to commit any such acts").
Furthermore, statistics from 1985 to 1994 indicate that younger and younger
juveniles are committing crimes; for example, the number of offenses committed
by 13 year-olds jumped 44% in the 10-year period with offenses against a person
jumping 20%. See id. at 18, fig.6 & tbl.22 (reporting increase in number ofjuvenile
offenses for 13 year-olds).
These increases are actually considerably lower in comparison to statistics
compiled from 1976 to 1986. "The arrest rate for thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds
for forcible rape doubled between 1976 and 1986 from 20 per 100,000 juveniles
age 13 and 14] to 40 per 100,000 [juveniles age 13 and 14]." Hunter Hurst, More
Sex, 19 Juv. & FAM. CT. NEWSL. (1988).
194. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 829-30 ("An examination of defendant's punishment in this case indicates it clearly comports with the 'evolving standards of decency' in society."). The court noted that "[c]hief among the concerns, especially
among city and county leaders, was the growing number of younger and younger
violent offenders." Id. at 830 (citing Verbatim Transcript,supra note 138, at 245-46,
249).
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Green Does Not Warrant Idealistic

Included in society's standards of decency is the goal of rehabilitating
juveniles.1 95 Accordingly, Green's sentence must be examined in light of
this goal. 1 96 In weighing the choice between imprisonment and rehabilitation, some courts have held that the harsh conditions of adult jails subject juveniles to cruel and unusual punishment. 19 7 Furthermore,
proponents of rehabilitation for juveniles find imprisonment cruel and
unusual because these harsh conditions often destroy any possibility of rehabilitation.19 8 Although rehabilitation is favored for juveniles because of
the proven effectiveness of rehabilitative efforts, the rehabilitative ideal
may and should be abandoned when the crime is of a sufficiently violent
nature such as forcible rape. 19 9
195. See Andrew D. Roth, Note, An Examination of Whether IncarceratedJuveniles
are Entitled by the Constitution to Rehabilitative Treatment, 84 MICH. L. Rv. 286, 288
(1985) (stating that "confinement absent rehabilitation violates evolving standards
of decency").
196. See State v. Dellinger, 468 S.E.2d 218, 220-21 (N.C. 1996) (noting that
juvenile transfers must be examined in light of goal of North Carolina's juvenile
code). The juvenile code of North Carolina seeks to rehabilitate juveniles and,
thus, the courts should follow this purpose when deciding whether to transfer. See
id. at 221. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States included this rehabilitative ideal as one of the Kent factors. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
566-67 (1966). For a discussion of the Kent factors, see supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1182 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding
that conditions that are constitutional in adult prisons may not be constitutional
when imposed on juveniles). Although juveniles are generally separated from the
general population in adult facilities, separation is not guaranteed. See In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967) (stating that there is no assurance that juveniles will be kept
separate from adult prisoners); see also Rothchild, supra note 46, at 741 (noting
that juveniles are not always sequestered from general population in adult
prisons).
Juveniles in adult prisons are likely to encounter dangerous conditions such as
overcrowding, inferior security and poor health care. See Patricia Puritz et al., Due
Process Advocacy Project Report: Seeking Better Representationfor Young Offenders, CriM.
JUST.,

Winter 1996, at 14-15.

198. See Rothchild, supra note 46, at 741-42 ("During confinement in adult
facilities, many juvenile offenders suffer physical, mental and psychological abuse
by adult inmates as well as by other juveniles. This abuse damages a juvenile offender's self-esteem. Even short periods of confinement in adult prisons can cause
juvenile offenders 'severe and irreparable damage."') (quoting Kristina H. Chung,
Note, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of IncarceratingJuveniles in Adult Jails, 66 IND.
LJ. 999, 1006-08 (1991)).
199. See Get Control of Child Rapists, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 16, 1995, at 10 (reporting that approximately 85-95% of juvenile offenders enrolled in treatment programs are rehabilitated through psychological treatment); Sally Kestin, State Gets
Wake-up Call on Child Sex Offenders, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 14, 1995, at 1 (same). Imprisonment of juveniles seriously hinders rehabilitative efforts. See Feld, supra note 28,
at 716-17 (warning of potential harms of imprisonment of juveniles); see also Gary
v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1434-36 (9th Cir. 1987) (Ferguson, J., concurring)
(stating that confinement of juveniles inhibits rehabilitation). Furthermore, increasing punitive penalties against juveniles does not help break their cycle of sex-
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The rehabilitative ideal should also be abandoned in the present case
because Green does fit the profile of the juvenile sex offender to which
rehabilitative efforts are most often tailored.20 0 The heinous nature of
Green's offense and the slight probability of successful rehabilitation due
to the atypical nature of the crime justifies the decision of the juvenile
judge in abandoning the rehabilitative ideal of North Carolina's juvenile

ual abuse. See Briscoe, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that statistics show that "young
offenders cannot be deterred from committing crimes simply by toughening the
criminal penalties"). Thus, by imprisoning juveniles, courts miss an opportunity to
rehabilitate the juvenile because "[u]nlike an adult offender, a juvenile sex offender's 'deviant patterns are less deeply ingrained and are therefore easier to
disrupt.'" Rothchild, supra note 46, at 751 (quoting FAY HONEY KNAPP, THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER: THE RATIONALE & GoALS OF EARLY INTERVENTION & TREATMENT 12

(1985)).
For a discussion of alternatives to imprisonment such as treatment centers and
community involvement, see Gordon Bazemore & Susan E. Day, Restoring the Balance: Juvenile and Community Justice,JUVENILE JUST., vol. 3, at 3 (1996). But see
Hurst, supra note 193 (stating that rehabilitation is not best disposition of violent
juvenile). The Director of the National Center for Juvenile Justice wrote,
"[Florcible rape-not homicide-is the classic crime of violence." Id. This is so
because homicide may often be committed in the heat of passion while rape is
always intentional. See id. Although Green was not convicted of forcible rape, he
was convicted of first-degree sexual offense and attempted forcible rape. See Green,
502 S.E.2d at 822.
Attempts to rehabilitate such sex offenders are almost useless. See Hurst, supra
note 193 ("Persons who commit assaultive sex offenses have proven almost totally
invulnerable to (the State's] best efforts to correct their behavior."). In fact, a sex
offender who begins as ajuvenile will typically commit 380 sex crimes during his or
her lifetime. See Eddie Lucio, Jr., Treating Sex Offenders Saves Victims, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Feb. 21, 1995, at A15 (noting high rate of recidivism). Thus, any successful rehabilitation of Green appears to be unlikely especially because " [ f] orcible
rape by a thirteen-year-old is double trouble. Delinquent behavior of any kind at
an early age is predictive of a criminal career. Rape by a thirteen-year-old is not
only predictive of a criminal career, it is predictive of a life of violence." Hurst,
supra note 193.
200. For a discussion of the juvenile sex offender profile, see Rothchild, supra
note 46, at 723-27. A juvenile sex offender is generally male. See id. at 724. The
juvenile's victim is typically a seven- or eight-year-old female. See id. at 726. Juvenile offenses generally occur in groups "such as inner-city gangs and sports teams"
as misguided attempts by juveniles to prove their manhood. Id. at 727; see Beth
Weinhouse, The Number of Rapes Committed by Youths Has Increased, YOUTH VIOLENCE
37, 37-38 (David L. Bender et al. eds., 1992) (stating that many juvenile sex offenses take place "when there's one guy who wants to prove he's a man and five
guys who are terrified of being thought of as less than one"). The "portrait" of the
juvenile sex offender is embodied by the example of "[flour boys, ages eleven to
fourteen, [who] accosted a thirteen-year-old girl on her way home from school,
'locked her into an outdoor shower stall and sexually assaulted her."' Rothchild,
supra note 46, at 719 (quoting Geeta Anand, Teens Perpetrate Many Sex Attacks,
Figures Show, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 18, 1995, at A19).
Green did not attack a younger, weaker female. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822
(stating that victim was 23-year-old stranger). Green did not attack his victim during a gang or team rite of passage. See id. at 822-23 (noting solitary and predatory
nature of crime).
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system.20 1 In fact, when balancing the "prospects for adequate protection
of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation," the absence
of any weight supporting rehabilitation tips considerably in favor of life
20 2
imprisonment for Green.
V.

IMPACT

The North Carolina legislature is charged with the double duty of
enacting legislation that: (1) satisfies the needs of the public and (2) preserves the constitutional minimum safeguards. 20 3 Section 7A-610 meets
the public's need to be protected from crime by enabling the juvenile
courts to transfer violent juveniles; the statute, however, fails to meet the
second prong. 20 4 North Carolina's transfer statute does not provide satisfactory guidelines to prevent patently arbitrary decisions. 20 5 Accordingly,
section 7A-610 violates the Due Process Clause and should be found void
20 6
for vagueness.
Effective July 1, 1999, the North Carolina Legislature repealed the
applicable transfer statute; whether the new laws better serve the precepts
of juvenile justice and/or the due process rights of juveniles, however, remains to be seen. 20 7 The North Carolina legislature should adopt the Kent
factors or, at the very least, the legislature should adopt transfer guidelines
201. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 832-33. The North Carolina Supreme Court
stated:
An examination of the crime committed by [Green] reveals it is not the
type attributable to or characteristic of a "child," nor is it one for which
the special considerations due children under the criminal justice system
are appropriate.... The cruelty of the attack, its predatory nature toward
an essential stranger, [Green's] refusal to accept full responsibility, his
difficulty controlling his temper, his previous record and his unsupportive family situation all suggest defendant is not particularly suited to the
purpose and type of rehabilitation dominant in the juvenile system.
Id. at 832 (emphasis added).
202. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 567 (1966). If the rehabilitative
ideal is abandoned because the nature of Green's crime indicates that rehabilitation is likely to fail, the only thing left on the scale is the public's need to be free
from violent, heinous crimes. See Hurst, supra note 193 (establishing that rehabilitative ideal may be discarded).
203. See N.C. CONsT. art. II, § 12 (stating that legislators take oath to uphold
United States Constitution as well as North Carolina Constitution); N.C. CoNsT.
art. I, §§ 2-3 (vesting authority of state in people).
204. For a discussion of the public's request for stricter juvenile laws and its
need to be protected from violent crimes, see supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of § 7A-610's lack of definite criteria, failure to include
Kent factors and sole requirement of a balancing test, see supra notes 145-66 and
accompanying text.
206. See United States ex rel. Pedrosa v. Sielaf, 434 F. Supp. 493, 495-97 (N.D.
Ill. 1977) (finding statute void for vagueness). For a discussion of § 7A-610's
vagueness, see supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
207. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-646 (repealed effective July 1, 1999).
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modeled after them. 20 8 Then, to preserve procedural due process, Green
need only be returned to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court from where
he could be transferred to the superior court again pursuant to a valid
transfer statute.20 9 If the due process violation was corrected in this manner, the sentence of life imprisonment may stand as a punishment which,
although severe, does not violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Con2 10
stitution or section 27, article 1 of the North Carolina Constitution.
State v. Green may be viewed either as a historical anomaly in which a
thirteen-year-old fell into a five-month window that resulted in life imprisonment or as a wake-up call reminding America of the juvenile justice
system's need for guidance in both process and punishment. 2 11 Data
show that incident rates of juvenile crime and juvenile violence will only
continue to increase as society evolves; simultaneously, the ages at which
juveniles commit these offenses continue to decrease. 2 12 In their role as
the public's elected representatives, state legislators will be required to balance the juvenile codes' rehabilitative ideal with the evolving standards of
2 13
decency.
208. For a discussion of the Kent factors and their adoption by other states,
see supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
209. See Sielaf 434 F. Supp. at 496 (holding that although juvenile was transferred pursuant to unconstitutionally vague statute, unconditional release was not
required); see also State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 826 (N.C. 1998) (failing to note
that finding of vagueness would not result in unconditional release). The court in
Sielaf held that the Illinois transfer statute was unconstitutionally vague and released the juvenile only to be transferred pursuant to the amended transfer statute, which preserved juvenile's due process. See Sielaf 434 F. Supp. at 496 (striking
down transfer statute and releasing defendant only to be transferred again).
210. For a discussion of the distinction between the severity of a punishment
and the unconstitutionality of a punishment on the grounds that it is cruel and
unusual, see supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
evolving standards of decency that surrounded the North Carolina legislature's
decision to lower the minimum age of transfer-a decision that facilitated the
prosecution and ultimate sentencing of Green, see supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
211. For a discussion of the amendments made to the North Carolina Juvenile Code that resulted in a five-month window during which a 13-year-old sex
offender could be transferred to superior court, tried and convicted as an adult
and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment, see supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text; see also Green, 502 S.E.2d at 835 (Frye, J., dissenting) (asserting that
North Carolina legislature was not aware of potential life imprisonment of 13-yearold for first-degree sex offense when amendments to § 7A-608 and sentencing
guidelines were made during same session but put into effect five months apart).
212. See Briscoe, supra note 12, at 3 ("Most experts agree that the number of
juveniles arrested for murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault will more than
double by 2010."); see also Burrs ET AL., supra note 193, at 5-7 (discussing trend
throughout history of increasing incidence rate of juvenile crime).
213. See Briscoe, supra note 12, at 4 (suggesting that solutions to increasing
rates ofjuvenile violence must focus on prevention and swift punishment and rec-

ognizing that "legitimate public concerns justify imprisoning dangerous, repeat
offenders"). For a discussion of precepts of juvenile justice system, see supra notes
24-39, 46-50 and accompanying text.
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Less than ten years ago, the Supreme Court acknowledged the dilemma facing state legislatures and established a minimum age for capital
punishment. 2 14 The time has come for the Supreme Court to take notice
of the alarming statistics regarding juvenile offenses and establish a minimum age for life imprisonment. 2 15 Until the Court so speaks, however,
state courts will struggle to adhere to the principles of the juvenile system
while more and more cries of outrage over juvenile violence and sentencing inundate the floors of state legislatures.
Paul G. Morrissey

214. For a discussion of the constitutional minimum age for infliction of capital punishment, see supra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
215. See Ninth Circuit Upholds, supra note 89, at 1190 (expressing concern over

lack of guidance from Supreme Court regarding noncapital sentencing of
juveniles). Due to the indeterminate nature of the Supreme Court stance on the
age that renders a sentence of life imprisonment cruel and unusual, the Court
"must seize the opportunity to provide better guidance to lower courts ...and
legislators in deciding th[is] difficult question[ ] that tug[s] at the fabric of society's conscience and go[es] to the heart of the meaning of the Eighth Amendment." Id.
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